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Abstract. We uncover privacy vulnerabilities in the ICAO 9303 standard implemented by ePassports
worldwide. These vulnerabilities, confirmed by ICAO, enable an ePassport holder who recently
passed through a checkpoint to be reidentified without opening their ePassport. This paper explains
how bisimilarity was used to discover these vulnerabilities, which exploit the BAC protocol – the
original ICAO 9303 standard ePassport authentication protocol – and remains valid for the PACE
protocol, which improves on the security of BAC in the latest ICAO 9303 standards. In order to tackle
such bisimilarity problems, we develop here a chain of methods for the applied pi-calculus including
a symbolic under-approximation of bisimilarity, called open bisimilarity, and a modal logic, called
classical FM, for describing and certifying attacks. Evidence is provided to argue for a new scheme
for specifying such unlinkability problems that more accurately reflects the capabilities of an attacker.
1. Introduction
Most of us have the option to pass through automatic passport clearance at an airport. Some of us
also have electronic national cards that may be used for government services. All of these machine
readable documents employ a protocol to authenticate with a reader, establishing that you really hold
a valid machine readable document. In order for ePassports to be read internationally, your passport
is likely to implement a standardised protocol for machine readable travel documents, defined by
the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) – the UN agency responsible for international
aviation standards.
Considerable work has been put into ensuring ePassports satisfy security properties, preventing
your ePassport from being read by an unauthorised 3rd-party in the vicinity. However, even if such
security properties are satisfied, there may still be ways of exploiting a protocol to mount more
subtle attacks on your privacy. Notably, a requirement of ePassports, is that an unauthorised 3rd-
party should not be able to use an ePassport to track the document holder. This privacy property is
called unlinkability, and is an official requirement of the ICAO 9303 standard for machine readable
travel documents [MRT15].
It has been debated over the past decade whether or not the ICAO 9303 standard satisfies
unlinkability. Vulnerabilities have been discovered by exploiting implementation specific features,
such as the different error messages in the French ePassport, or the differences in response time
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of the ePassports of different nationalities [CS10, ABH+16]. For example, an error message in
the French ePassport indicates whether a message authentication code (MAC) test passed, despite
authentication failing; hence if a message with the same MAC key is replayed from a previous
session with the same ePassport, then we can detect whether or not the same ePassport is present in
the current session. Notice this requires no access to the personal data stored inside the ePassport.
Now put implementation-specific side channels aside and consider whether unlinkability holds
at the level of the specification of the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol, as defined in the ICAO
9303 standard. A claim was reported in CSF’10 [ACRR10] that unlinkability does hold for ePass-
ports that conservatively implement the BAC protocol. In particular, the claim concerns implemen-
tations where the same plaintext message should be provided for all types of error, as is the case
for the UK ePassport for example. That claim was backed up by a formal model of a property
that should hold if unlinkability of BAC holds, which is expressed as a bisimilarity problem in the
applied pi-calculus [ABF17]. The problem is that this original claim was discovered to be false, as
reported in ESORICS’19 [FHMS19]. This indicates a failure of the ICAO 9303 BAC protocol to
meet its own requirements.
However, this is not the end of the story behind this privacy vulnerability, which has sev-
eral twists. A twist is that the original claim which we discovered to be flawed was based on
a proof in ProVerif, that went through due to a bug, now resolved in Proverif. When the bug
was corrected the old proof didn’t go through, but no proof or counter-example was reported un-
til ESORICS’19 [FHMS19]. This indicates the need to improve methods and tools for supporting
bisimilarity checking in the applied pi-calculus, so that false privacy claims about widely deployed
protocols do not go undetected for a decade.
There are further twists in this story. In the effort to improve tools and methods for resolving
such unlinkability problems, several alternative specifications modelling the unlinkability of BAC
have been proposed over the years. Some such models can be used to prove that there is no at-
tack [HBD19], first communicated in S&P’16 [HBD16]. The key difference between the original
CSF’10 model, for which we discovered an attack in ESORICS’19, and the S&P’16 model, where
they prove there is no attack, is the use of trace equivalence rather than bisimilarity in the latter. This
is interesting, since there are few, if any, protocols and properties where the use of bisimilarity rather
than trace equivalence is essential for discovering vulnerabilities, at least for a widely-deployed pro-
tocol. Furthermore, it provokes the question of which equivalence provides the appropriate attacker
model: are vulnerabilities discovered using bisimilarity, but undetectable using trace equivalence
exploitable; and, if so, are they perhaps less dangerous in some sense than attacks which can be
described as a trace?
For the BAC protocol we have answered the question of exploitability in the positive. Using a
modified reader and ePassport we have demonstrated how the distinguishing game exposed by the
failure of bisimilarity can be exploited to reidentify an ePassport. That particular implementation
of the vulnerability discovered using bisimilarity (there are infinitely many mutations of this attack)
was reported through a responsible disclosure process to ICAO in June 2019.
ICAO issued a public response made available via numerous press reports [Del19, Lab19a,
Lab19b]. In their response, ICAO make the following statement.
“It’s also important to consider here that the described issue, which could be ex-
ploited for example at border controls or at other inspection system areas, would
only allow adversaries to be able to know that somebody recently passed through a
passport check– and even without opening their ePassport. The personal data stored
in the contactless chip, however, would not be disclosed.”
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Understandably, ICAO aim to contain this issue, and we have no interest in creating a scandal, only
in ensuring the appropriate agencies receive accurate information. However, please note that the
above statement confirms that ICAO agree the vulnerability is real and would, we quote again for
emphasis, “allow adversaries to be able to know that somebody recently passed through a passport
check– and even without opening their ePassport.” This exactly matches our own claims about
the capabilities offered to an attacker exploiting the vulnerability discovered. The word “recent”
in the above context, means that the ePassport can only be tracked for as long as the attacker can
keep open a session with the reader that the ePassport holder recently passed through; which, in
practice, can only be a short period of time. This contrasts to more serious implementation specific
vulnerabilities, which can be exploited to track the ePassport holder indefinitely. Being able to
reidentify someone within a time-limited period is nonetheless a violation of unlinkability.
It is also important that we clarify the following public response from ICAO, also, under-
standably, aiming to contain any fallout from a vulnerability affecting citizens using their ePassport
standard world-wide.
“ICAO and experts have thoroughly reviewed this research and their initial analysis
is that it is not linked to Doc 9303 specifications in their current version. This
is especially the case given that the newest Doc 9303 specifications incorporate the
PACE protocol, which is considered a more secure alternative to the BAC protocol.”
What the above means is that the vulnerability reported at ESORICS’19 was for the BAC protocol.
The BAC protocol is the authentication mechanism used to ensure the ePassport and reader are
really talking to each other before exchanging any personal data stored on the ePassport. It has been
used since the first generation of ePassports, issued since 2004, and, at the time of writing, is still
supported by ePassports. BAC has known security limitations, for example the keys are generated
using information such as the passport number and expiry dates, which have low entropy [BFK09].
Thus there are attacks that can enable a user to compromise the secrecy of the personal data on an
ePassport protected by BAC. For this reason, ICAO have developed the Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol, addressing such vulnerabilities that can lead to data
breaches. Note a data breach would also immediately compromise unlinkability, since the attacker
would have direct access to the identity of the ePassport holder.
Thus, PACE is an improvement over BAC from the perspective of secrecy; however, secrecy
and privacy are not the same thing. Indeed, we report here that, PACE is also vulnerable to attacks
on unlinkability by adopting a similar strategy to the attacks on BAC reported in ESORICS’19. As
with BAC, we can formally account for this vulnerability by showing that PACE does not satisfy
unlinkability, formalised in terms of bisimilarity. Note that ePassports implementing BAC or PACE
are now issued by over 150 countries1, hence the impact for society of this vulnerability is global.
This paper is an extended version of a paper presented at ESORICS’19. In the conference
version of this paper, we explained the privacy vulnerability discovered in the BAC protocol and
explained how the attack can be implemented in a real world setting. This paper complements
the conference version by focusing on our methodology for analysing such unlinkability problems
rather than the implementation concerns. We explain the formal methods we developed and em-
ployed to quickly discover attacks on the unlinkability of the BAC protocol, and, going beyond the
ESORICS’19 paper, also the PACE protocol. To approach the bisimilarity problem behind unlink-
ability, we employ a game between a prover aiming to show unlinkability holds and a disprover
aiming to show there is an attack on unlinkability. The prover uses symbolic techniques to try to
construct a bisimulation for an under-approximation of bisimilarity (open bisimilarity); while the
1Gemalto on ePassport trends: https://www.gemalto.com/govt/travel/electronic-passport-trends
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disprover aims to verify whether any attacks discovered are genuine distinguishing strategies inval-
idating the bisimilarity problem or whether they are spurious counter-examples due to the fact that
symbolic methods are incomplete. If a spurious counter-example is discovered, then the reason why
it is spurious is used to refine and resume the search for a bisimulation. If this game terminates,
we should have constructed either a bisimulation (thereby proving the unlinkability property) or
a modal logic formula explaining a distinguishing strategy (thereby discovering an attack on un-
linkability). Another notable feature of the method in this work is that we show that unlinkability
problems, which are traditionally expressed as a weak bisimilarity problem, can be reduced to a
strong bisimilarity problem, thereby ensuring the transition system is image finite, considerably
simplifying the problem. This is, in itself, a contribution of this work, since strong bisimilarity
had not previously been defined for the applied pi-calculus, nor has its characteristic modal logic
previously been defined, for which we provide soundness and completeness results.
How to read this paper. The focus of this paper is on analysing unlinkability properties of
ePassport protocols. During the course of our discussion on unlinkability, we introduce various
methods which play a role in our formal analysis. In order to follow these methods some knowledge
of the pi-calculus and bisimilarity is a prerequisite. It is not necessary to have knowledge of the
applied pi-calculus, since we introduce a state-of-the-art presentation of the semantics of the applied
pi-calculus facilitating the translation of recent advances in the theory of the pi-calculus to the setting
of the applied pi-calculus. We move quickly through such definitions, in order to get the point
concerning how the methods are used to discover attacks on unlinkability.
In Sections 2 and 3, we explain our methodology and how it can be used to efficiently analyse
problems such as the unlinkability of ePassport protocols, thereby providing evidence necessary
to prove that we have closed the question of whether the original formulation of the unlinkability
of ePassport protocol BAC is violated. Section 4 reflects on established notions of unlinkability,
thereby making a case for instead employing a new notion of unlinkability which makes the realis-
tic assumption that an attacker can distinguish between communications originating from different
ePassport sessions. Section 5 demonstrates that there is a similar attack on the unlinkability of
the latest ePassport protocol PACE. The existence of a new attack on PACE, similar to the attack
we discovered on BAC, is confirmed using our methodology. We conclude in Sections 6 and 7,
by acknowledging the wider discussion on ePassport privacy and unlinkability to which this paper
contributes.
2. Reducing strong unlinkability to a strong bisimilarity problem
The ICAO 9303 standard recommends two authentication protocols for ePassports. The Basic Ac-
cess Control protocol (BAC) was the authentication protocol originally proposed. The Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol (PACE) was added in the 7th edition of the stan-
dard released in 2015.
In this section, here we briefly explain the BAC protocol and show how it can be modelled as
processes in the applied pi-calculus. We capture a version of the BAC protocol implemented in UK
ePassports, as defined in CSF’10 [ACRR10]. We should clarify that the UK version of the BAC
protocol captures the way countries should implement the BAC protocol; hence our analysis is not
limited UK ePassports – it applies to ePassport worldwide. We focus, in the next two sections, on
a methodology that we used to discover unlinkability attacks on the BAC protocol. An analysis of
the PACE protocol appears later in Sec. 5.
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ePassport Reader
ke, km
get challenge
Fresh nt, kt Fresh nr, kr
nt
Msg = {〈nr, 〈nt′, kr〉〉}ke
Mac = mac(Msg, km)
〈Msg, Mac〉
error
Mac 6= mac(Msg, km)
error
nt′ 6= nt
Msg′ = {〈nt, 〈nr, kt〉〉}ke
Mac′ = mac(Msg′, km)
〈Msg′, Mac′〉
Figure 1: The BAC protocol with one error message for all reasons for failure.
2.1. The BAC protocol. The BAC protocol is sketched informally in Fig. 1. Dashed lines (d)
indicate a message transmitted via an OCR session that reads the personal page of an ePassport.
The data read in the initial OCR session is used to calculate the symmetric keys ke and km used
respectively for encryption and as the seed of message authentication codes (MACs). Importantly,
these keys are the same for every session involving the same ePassport. Solid lines are wireless
communications between a chip embedded in the ePassport and radio frequency reader.
The reader first sends a constant message get challenge requesting a challenge – a nonce nt
sent by the ePassport – which is used during the mutual authentication of the ePassport and reader.
The reader shows it has the keys by responding to the challenge with a message including nonce
nt encrypted and authenticated using the keys, thereby authenticating the reader from the perspec-
tive of the ePassport. In that message, the reader sends its own challenge nr, which the ePassport
must respond to. The ePassport responds to the reader with a message involving nonces nr and
nt encrypted and authenticated using the keys, thereby authenticating the ePassport to the reader.
Notice only the ePassport that shared keys ke and km and sent challenge nt can respond in this way,
assuming the keys are never exchanged with a malicious 3rd-party.
We can be precise about the functional properties that BAC achieves. Firstly, BAC achieves
an authentication property called (injective) agreement [Low97]. Secondly, BAC establishes shared
secrets kr and kt which are used to generate a symmetric key for transmitting personal data. These
properties are easily checked using automated tools such as Scyther [Cre08].
We will see that, for unlinkability, the error branches in the protocol have an important role.
The ICAO 9303 standard specifies that an “operating system dependent error” [MRT15] should
be sent when authentication fails. Such a failure occurs when, upon the ePassport receiving an
authentication request, either the message authentication code (MAC) is wrong, or a nonce in the
message does not match the challenge nt previously sent by the ePassport. In this work, we assume
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all “operating system dependent error” messages are the same, since distinctions between error
messages lead to known serious attacks, such as those discovered for an implementation of the
French ePassport [ACRR10,CS10]. Thus we consider the scenario where an ePassport manufacturer
does not make the mistake of introducing this well known potential implementation flaw hence any
attack we discover is valid for ePassport implementations worldwide.
2.2. BAC in the applied pi-calculus. We employ the applied pi-calculus to model the operational
behaviour of participants in the protocol and how they are combined to form a system. The syntax
of processes is presented in Fig. 2, along with a message theory featuring pairs and symmetric
encryption (encryption using a shared secret key). The message theory also features a MAC function
– a cryptographic hash function with no equations.
For readability, we employ the abbreviation let x = M in P , P
{
M/x
}
in the following specifi-
cations of an ePassport (MRTD) and ePassport reader (Reader).
MRTD , ck〈ke, km〉.d(x).[x = get challenge]νnt.c〈nt〉.d(y).
if snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km) then
if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke))) then
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(y) , ke)), kt〉〉}ke in
c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
else c〈error〉
else c〈error〉
Reader , ck(xk).c〈get challenge〉.d(nt).νnr.νkr.
letm = {〈nr, 〈nt, kr〉〉}fst(xk) in c〈m, mac(〈m, snd(xk)〉)〉
We can express the system and idealised specification, respectively, as follows.
System , νck.(!Reader | !νke.νkm.!MRTD)
In the system above, the private channel ck is used to initiate a session between an ePassport and
Reader. The use of a private channel in this way is a modelling trick to hide all information ex-
changed via OCR sessions that we assume cannot be intercepted using wireless technology. Notice
that the keys ke and km serve as the identity of each ePassport, since they are fixed for an ePassport
when it is manufactured. Thus the innermost replication in !νke.νkm.!MRTD models that the same
ePassport may be used across multiple sessions, while the outermost replication indicates that there
are many different ePassports, each employing distinct keys.
P,Q F 0 deadlock
| M〈N〉.P send
| M(y).P receive
| if M = N then P elseQ branch
| [M = N]P match
| [M , N]P mismatch
| νx.P new
| P | Q parallel
| !P replication
M,N F x variable
| mac(M,N) mac
| 〈M,N〉 pair
| fst(M) left
| snd(M) right
| {M}N encryption
| dec(M,N) decryption
fst(〈M, N〉) =E M snd(〈M, N〉) =E N
dec({M}K ,K) =E M {dec(M,K)}K =E M
Figure 2: A syntax for applied pi-calculus processes with a message theory E.
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2.3. Strong unlinkability and bisimilarity. We formulate strong unlinkability as an equivalence
problem by setting out to show that System, as defined above, is equivalent to an idealised specifi-
cation of the system that trivially satisfies unlinkability. The idealised specification models a more
restricted variant of the system where each ePassport is used only once – as if, once an ePassport is
read, it is destroyed and a new ePassport is issued for any future sessions. We employ the following
process to model the specification.
Spec , νck.(!Reader | !νke.νkm.MRTD)
Notice the only difference between System and Spec is the absence of replication after the generation
of the key. Thus, in Spec, each new session is with a new ePassport with a freshly generated key.
Trivially, there is no way to link two sessions with the same ePassport in the above specification.
We specify unlinkability by stating that it holds whenever System and Spec are equivalent from
the perspective of an attacker. In principle, the idea is that, if an attacker cannot tell the difference
between a scenario where the same tag is allowed to be used in multiple sessions and the scenario
where each tag is really used once, then you cannot link two uses of the same tag.
In formulations of strong unlinkability, when we say “equivalent”, we mean equivalent with re-
spect to a particular notion of bisimilarity called weak early bisimilarity. We should potential avoid
confusion of terminology: “strong” in the context of unlinkability does not refer to the process
equivalence, but instead the particular formulation of unlinkability in terms of an equivalence prob-
lem rather than as a property of traces. In what follows, we briefly present a formulation of weak
early bisimilarity for the applied pi-calculus. Our presentation makes use of processes extended with
the knowledge of the attacker and an early labelled transition system which simplifies the analysis
of bisimilarity problems.
We follow the convention that labelled transitions are always defined directly on extended pro-
cesses in normal form. Adopting normal forms removes the need for several additional conditions
that must be imposed in older formulations of bisimilarity for the applied pi-calculus [ABF17].
Definition 2.1 (extended processes in normal form). Extended processes ν~x.(σ | P) consist of a set
of restricted names ~x, a substitution σ mapping variables to messages, and an applied pi-calculus
process P, where we write νx1.νx2. . . . νxn.P as νx1, x2, . . . xn.P. The set of free variables for process
terms and α-conversion are as standard, where νx.P and M(x).P bind x in P. We say that a variable
x is fresh for a term P (processes or messages) whenever the variable does not appear free in the
term, i.e., x < fv(P). A variable x is said to be fresh for a substitution σ whenever xσ = x and, for
all y, either x is fresh for yσ or x = y, i.e., σ does not change or use x in any way. Freshness extends
in the obvious point-wise fashion to sets of variables, terms and substitutions.
In this work, we always assume extended processes are in normal form meaning they are subject
to the restriction that the variables dom(σ) (i.e., those variables z such that z , zσ) are fresh for
~x, fv(P) and fv(yσ), for all variables y (i.e., σ is idempotent, and substitution σ has already been
applied to P). The substitution in an extended process is referred to as an active substitution.
We require the following definitions for composing extended processes in parallel and with
substitutions, defined whenever z is fresh for B and ρ, and also dom(σ) ∩ dom(θ) = ∅.
σ | θ | Q , σ · θ | Q (σ | P) | (θ | Q) , σ · θ | (P | Q)
ρ | νz.A , νz.(ρ | A) B | νz.A , νz.(B | A) νz.A | B , νz.(A | B)
We require a standard notion of static equivalence, which checks two processes are indistin-
guishable in terms of the messages output so far.
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M =E M′ N =E N′
Inp
M(x).P M
′ N′I P
{
N/x
} M =E M′ x is fresh for M,N,M′, P Out
M〈N〉.P M′(x)I
{
N/x
}
| P
A pi I B x < n(pi)
Res
νx.A pi I νx.B
P piσI A bn(pi) is fresh for σ
Alias
σ | P pi I σ | A
P pi I A M =E N
Mat
[M = N]P pi I A
P pi I A M =E N
Then
if M = N then P elseQ pi I A
P pi I A M ,E N
Mis
[M , N]P pi I A
Q pi I A M ,E N
Else
if M = N then P elseQ pi I A
P pi I A bn(pi) is fresh for Q
Par-l
P | Q pi I A | Q
P pi I A
Rep-act
!P pi I A | !P
P M(x)I ν~z.
({
N/x
}
| P′
)
Q M NI Q′ {x} ∪~z are fresh for Q
Close-l
P | Q τ I ν~z.(P′ | Q′)
P M(x)I ν~z.
({
N/x
}
| Q
)
P M NI R ~z are fresh for P
Rep-close
!P τ I ν~z.(Q | R | !P)
Figure 3: An early labelled transition system, plus symmetric rules for parallel composition.
Definition 2.2 (static equivalence). Extended processes in normal form ν~x.(σ | P) and ν~y.(θ | Q) are
statically equivalent whenever, for all messages M and N such that ~x∪~y are fresh for M and N, we
have Mσ =E Nσ if and only if Mθ =E Nθ.
The above definitions are employed in our definition of “early” labelled transitions (Fig. 3),
which are defined directly on extended processes in normal form. Labels on transitions are either:
τ – an internal communication; M(z) – an output on channel M binding the output message to
variable z; or M N – an input on channel M receiving message N. Define the bound variables such
that bn(pi) = {x} only if pi = M(x) and bn(pi) = ∅ otherwise. Define the free variables such that
fv(M N) = fv(M)∪ fv(N), fv
(
M(x)
)
= fv(M)∪ {x} and fv(τ) = ∅. These sets are not disjoint, due to
the context in which these definitions are used.
Notice, in this labelled transition system, if-then-else, match and mismatch inherit their
actions from the processes they guard, which aligns with the traditional style of the pi-calculus. This
contrasts to established reduction semantics [ABF17] for the applied pi-calculus, where if-then-else
statements perform additional τ-transitions in order to resolve guards. This design decision will en-
able us to provide genuine “strong” counterparts to the weak equivalences that we define.
The early labelled transition system and static equivalence together can be used to define weak
early bisimilarity. Since, initially, we employ a weak formulation of early bisimilarity, we make use
of weak transitions A pi I B which allow zero or more τ-transitions to occur before and after the
transition pi, or zero transitions if pi = τ.
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Definition 2.3 (weak early bisimilarity). A symmetric relation between extended processes R is a
weak early bisimulation only if, whenever A R B the following hold:
• A and B are statically equivalent.
• If A pi I A′ there exists B′ such that B pi I B′ and A′ R B′.
Processes P and Q are weak early bisimilar, written P ≈ Q, whenever there exists an weak early
bisimulation R such that P R Q.
Now we have the formal tools to express the theorem that confirms that strong unlinkability
does not hold for the BAC protocol.
Theorem 2.4. System 0 Spec.
The above is the theorem rectifying the flawed claim, communicated in CSF’10 [ACRR10],
that unlinkability holds for this formulation of the BAC protocol. Much of the rest of the paper
is dedicated to explaining the methodology we used to prove the above result, by constructing an
attack strategy invalidating the claim in Sec. 3. Later in Sec. 4 we will also make a case for adjusting
the model and in Sec. 5 we will show how the analysis can be repeated for PACE.
2.4. Reducing weak to strong bisimilarity. A challenge with the CSF’10 [ACRR10] specification
of unlinkability is that it is formulated using a weak transitions, which are not image finite.
Definition 2.5. A labelled transition system, given by a relation say I, is image finite for a process
A, whenever for any label pi there are finitely many B such that A pi I B, up to α-conversion.
The strong labelled transition relation I defined in Fig. 3 is image finite for all extended
processes; whereas its weak labelled transition relation I is only image finite for some extended
processes. In particular, I is not image finite for processes System and Spec that are used to
specify the unlinkability problem. To see this observe there are infinitely many states reachable by
τ-transitions from Spec of the following form, where n sessions have started by communicating on
the private channel ck.
Spec I νck, ke1, km1, . . . ken, kmn.
(
V(ke1, km1) | . . .V(ken, kmn) |!Reader |
P(ke1, km1) | . . .P(ken, kmn) | !νke.νkm.MRTD
)
where
P(ke, km) , d(x).
[
x = get challenge
]
νnt.c〈nt〉.d(y).
if snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km) then
if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke))) then
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(y) , ke)), kt〉〉}ke in
c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
else c〈error〉
else c〈error〉
V(ke, km) , c〈get challenge〉.d(nt).νnr.νkr.
letm = {〈nr, 〈nt, kr〉〉}ke in c〈m, mac(〈m, km〉)〉
When we do not have image finiteness we need to find a finite representation of infinitely many
processes reachable by a transition, which can make verification challenging. To simplify verifica-
tion, we show that the problem of analysing the unlinkability of BAC can be transformed into an
equivalent problem where image finiteness does hold, thereby avoiding the need to explicitly deal
with reasoning about transitions such as the above. The procedure we employ involves removing
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the τ-transition from the model – a process known as saturation – thereby reducing the unlinkability
problem to a strong early bisimilarity problem.
We define an alternative system System and specification Spec, as follows.
System , !νke.νkm.!(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
Spec , !νke.νkm.(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
In the above processes, the keys ke and km have been distributed in advance to the relevant parties;
hence a τ-transition is not required to initiate a reader and ePassport with the same keys. We then
show that each process above is bisimilar to the original system and specification, respectively. It is
easier to establish a more general result, stated in the lemma below, which can be used to transform
the unlinkability problem for related protocols into a form where we have image finiteness. We make
use of the term a(x1, x2, . . . xn).P as an abbreviation for a(x).P
{
proj1(x),proj2(x),...projn(x)/x1,x2,...xn
}
,
where proji is the obvious generalisation of fst() and snd() to n-tuples.
Lemma 2.6. For any P and Q such that ck is fresh for P and Q, we have
νck.
(
!ck(~k).P | !ν~k.ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
≈ !ν~k.(P | Q)
Notice the proof, provided in Appendix A, is just a sketch. To go through all details would be
cumbersome, indicating the amount of work that is saved when applying the above lemma to reduce
the complexity of the unlinkability problem we aim to solve.
By a similar argument, we can also establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. For any P and Q such that ck is fresh for P and Q, we have
νck.
(
!ck(~k).P | !ν~k.!ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
≈ !ν~k.!(P | Q)
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7 we obtain.
Corollary 2.8. System ≈ Spec if and only if System ≈ Spec.
Since, in this model of the BAC protocol, all communications on public channels use channel c
for outputs and d for inputs, there are no τ-transitions in System or Spec. Thereby we have reduced
the problem to a form where we can apply the strong variant of early bisimilarity, defined as follows.
Definition 2.9 (strong early bisimilarity). A symmetric relation between extended processes R is a
strong early bisimulation only if, whenever A R B the following hold:
• A and B are statically equivalent.
• If A pi I A′ there exists B′ such that B pi I B′ and A′ R B′.
Processes P and Q are strong early bisimilar, written P ∼ Q, whenever there exists a strong early
bisimulation R such that P R Q.
Notice the only difference compared to Def. 2.3 is that, in clause two, every transition is
matched by a single transition – extra τ-transitions are not permitted. The following theorem sum-
marises the correctness of the transformation of the unlinkability problem applied in this section,
where the proof is immediate from Corollary 2.8 and the absence of τ-transitions in System and
Spec.
Theorem 2.10. System ≈ Spec if and only if System ∼ Spec.
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2.5. A tribute to Jos Baeten in the language of process equivalences. In this work, we make use
of both “weak” and “strong” equivalences, since the original formulation of strong unlinkability was
in terms of a weak equivalence, but strong equivalences are easier to work with. Indeed, the authors
were inspired by a panel discussion during the 20th edition of CONCUR chaired by Jos Baeten, to
whom this paper is dedicated on the occasion of his retirement. The idea that strong equivalences
are easier to work with was a point of view raised by Jos Baeten during that panel session.
The above mentioned panel session, during the 20th edition of CONCUR, ended with a question
from the audience, “but what can you do with all these process equivalences?” The response from
a panellist was one word: “security.” Indeed, this paper embodies that panel session, since we go
deeper into the spectrum of process equivalences in several dimensions in order to obtain results in
the security domain.
Beyond the “weak”/“strong” dimension, another dimension we exploit in this work is the dis-
tinction between “early” and “open” equivalences. In the next section, we introduce a notion of
“strong open” bisimilarity, which is described in terms of an “open late” labelled transition sys-
tem. Traditionally, the applied pi-calculus has been endowed with a notion of bisimilarity called
“labelled bisimilarity,” which, is little more than an alias for “weak early” bisimilarity (Def. 2.3).
Our primary reason for moving from “early” to “open” is that the open setting enables symbolic
methods to be directly applied hence is easier to check systematically. Open bisimilarity should
however be applied carefully, since it is strictly finer than early bisimilarity; indeed, open bisimilar-
ity is intuitionistic whereas early bisimilarity is classical [AHT17]. The significance of this insight
was emphasised by Jos Baeten himself at the 28th edition of CONCUR during the best paper award
ceremony, indicating another way in which his leadership has influenced this paper.
One might say, “well, if it’s easier to check, why not just fix open bisimilarity as the target
equivalence?” This view doesn’t hold up for two reasons. Firstly, the security community are used
to weak early bisimilarity, so confidence is increased if we can verify which attacks discovered using
open bisimilarity are also valid for weak early bisimilarity. Secondly, taking a fresh position, open
bisimilarity is a little too fine for proving some security and privacy properties, so a better target
equivalence for open processes (those containing free variables) would be “quasi-open” bisimilarity
which balances the qualities of early bisimilarity and open bisimilarity – a discussion on this appears
in a companion report [Hor18]. Thus when checking bisimilarity, we require both a notion of open
bisimilarity which is easier to explore symbolically, and also a coarser equivalence such as early
bisimilarity (or quasi-open bisimilarity) that serves as our target notion of bisimilarity; and, during
the search for a proof or a counterexample (an attack), we play a game where we move between
these equivalences. This methodology we illustrate in the next section. For the above reasons, the
reader should be aware of how to move between the “weak early”, “strong early” and “strong open”
variants of bisimilarity, since they come together to form a methodology for solving unlinkability
problems.
Going further, we could exploit further dimensions in the spectrum of process equivalences –
a point we return to in Section 4.2. In particular, we can move along the “linear-time”/ “branching-
time” spectrum [vG01] to pick out coarser equivalences than bisimilarity, which can be connected
with a spectrum of attacker/threat models. In short, the choice of equivalence can control the testing
capabilities of an attacker, which can restrict the space of attacks that we range over when we verify
a security or privacy property. These intermediate definitions can be obtained by taking any of the
above mentioned notions of bisimilarity and restricting them in various ways. Indeed, the linear-
time/branching-time spectrum was the main topic of the aforementioned panel discussion chaired
by Jos Baeten, and has been a running theme throughout his work [BBK87, ABW06, MDBdV12].
Looking beyond the current paper, there are further uncharted depths to be explored in terms of
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exploiting the spectrum of process equivalences to both understand attacker/threat models and to
enable new methodologies for verification in the security domain. For example, all equivalences in
this work “interleave” actions, but there is a spectrum of “non-interleaving” or “truly concurrent”
equivalences that make explicit subtle distinctions that occur when there may be multiple attackers
that are not co-located or where the duration of events is significant [BB91, BB93, BB98]. This
line of inspiration, assimilated into this paper, runs back to the days when the second author was
supervised by Jos Baeten at the University of Amsterdam [BBMV91], during which time the inter-
personal style of Jos Baeten set a benchmark for the career of the second author.
3. Searching for a bisimulation symbolically
Having reduced unlinkability to a strong bisimilarity problem, we now aim to prove or disprove
System ∼ Spec. To do so, we attempt to construct a strong early bisimulation R (Def. 2.9) such that
System R Spec. However, naı¨vely searching for a bisimulation using the early labelled transition
system in Fig. 3 is challenging, since we must consider an infinite number of messages which can
be received for every input. And, although it has been shown that checking a bounded number of
such messages suffices for message theories such as the one we employ, the bound on the number
of messages to check is hyper-exponential [Hu¨t03].
For this reason, it makes sense to approach the problem using symbolic methods, for which
we apply open bisimilarity which is an under-approximation of early bisimilarity – that is, if two
processes are open bisimilar then they are early bisimilar, but not necessarily vice-versa. Open
bisimilarity is suited to symbolic methods, since it uses a call-by-need approach to instantiating
inputs where variables representing inputs are only instantiated when they are needed in order to
enable a transition. Due to the fact that open bisimilarity is an under-approximation, care must be
taken, since open bisimilarity however may discover certain spurious attacks for the BAC unlinka-
bility problem.2 Hence the use of open bisimilarity must be complemented by a methodology for
verifying whether an attack discovered using symbolic methods is a real attack or not.
3.1. Open bisimilarity as a symbolic bisimilarity. Open bisimilarity is suited to symbolic anal-
ysis of protocols, since it permits inputs to be lazily instantiated. Previously, open bisimilarity has
been defined for a slightly less abstract cryptographic calculus, called the spi-calculus [BN07,Tiu07,
AG99]. The spi-calculus is less general since it is hard wired with mechanisms for implementing
specific equational theories which are abstracted away in the applied pi-calculus, making the applied
pi-calculus more concise and allowing it to be instantiated with more theories.
For analysing the unlinkability of ePassports we require the additional power of the applied pi-
calculus, hence introduce a notion of open bisimilarity for the applied pi-calculus. This definition of
open bisimilarity is a contribution of this paper. The definitions we provide do have many features
in common with notions of symbolic bisimilarity [HL95] for the applied pi-calculus, particularly
the work of Liu and Lin [LL12]. We should clarify that such notions of symbolic bisimilarity were
never intended to capture open bisimilarity, due to their classical interpretation of constraints; their
objective was to directly implement early bisimilarity (or early congruence – the largest congruence
relation contained in early bisimilarity).
Open bisimilarity is defined in terms of an open late labelled transition system, presented in
Fig. 4, where, like the early labelled transition system in Fig. 3, the rules are only well defined for
2 The spurious counterexamples arise due to the fact that guards in if-then-else statements are treated intuitionisti-
cally. We leave it to related work to explain why open bisimilarity is intuitionistic [AHT17,HALT18], and what spurious
examples may arise [Hor18]. We will focus here on a counterexample that is not spurious.
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extended processes in normal form. We firstly explain the “open late” terminology (in comparison
to “closed early”, where “closed” is the antonym for “open” in this setting).
Late v.s. early. A key difference between these labelled transition systems is that, in a late labelled
transition system, the input labels are of the form M(x), where M is a message representing a recipe
for producing a channel and x is variable which acts as a placeholder for some input message.
Notice in rule Inp in Fig. 3 the message input is chosen immediately (from infinitely many possible
messages) and hence the input message appears on the input label; whereas, in rule oInp in Fig. 4
the input message appears as a variable. The use of a variable means that we do not need to decide
immediately which messages should be chosen as inputs; instead, we can instantiate the variable
later in a called-by-need fashion, possibly after several steps (subject to some constraints as we will
explain below). The key rules that change to accommodate a late approach to inputs compared to
the early approach are the rules oInp, oClose-l, oRep-close.
In order to accommodate the late input labels, we must change slightly the definition of the
bound names and free names of a label, compared to the corresponding definition for the early
labelled transition system, as follows: the bound variables are such that bn(M(x)) = bn
(
M(x)
)
= {x}
and bn(τ) = ∅; while the free variables are such that fv(M(x)) = fv
(
M(x)
)
= fv(M) ∪ {x} and
fv(τ) = ∅. These definitions are used in the rules of Fig. 4.
Open v.s. closed. The keyword open in the term open late labelled transition system refers to the
fact that we allow free variables to appear. Due to the presence of free variables, we must keep
track of a constraint system that determines what messages are allowed to be substituted for each
free variable. We succinctly represent these constraints by keeping track of a history which records
the order in which inputs and outputs occurred, which allows us to determine which messages had
already been output before each input occurs and hence were available to use when performing
an input. This avoids the possibility of a variable representing an input making use of knowledge
from the future. In our representation of constraints, we also employ a set of inequalities between
messages D = {M1 , N1,M2 , N2, . . .}, called a distinction. Distinctions are used to symbolically
handle inequality constraints that typically arise due to the presence of else branches.
Histories are defined by grammar h F  | h · xo | h · Mi, representing the order in which
messages are sent and received. An annotated variable xo means some output occurred which we
refer to indirectly using an alias x where x appears in the domain of some active substitution θ
which is associated with some extended process of the form ν~y.(θ | P); thus xθ is the message term
that is output, which possibly contains private names, i.e., variables ~y bound by the ν binder. The
annotated variable Mi represents a larger message that has been input, which, initially is a variable,
but may later be a message when the input variable is lazily instantiated. Notice, in Fig. 4, each rule
carries a history and distinction that may be used to resolve the oElse rule, by providing sufficient
evidence that two messages are not equal (i.e., negation is treated intuitionistically). Another key
differences compared to Fig. 3 are the updating of the history in rule oRes, which has the effect of
further constraining free variables such that none of them may directly refer to any private name.
That is, when instantiating inputs, we may not use directly the variables ~x in an extended process
of the form ν~x.(θ | P); we may only refer to messages containing those variables indirectly via the
variables in dom(θ) that are used as aliases for outputs.
The definitions. The effect of histories on restricting the substitutions that may be applied, as de-
scribed above, is captured formally in the following definition. Substitutions respecting histories,
are key to the lazy approach of open bisimilarity.
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M =E M′θ x is fresh for M,M′, h,D, θ
oInp
h,D : θ | M(x).P M′(x)I θ | P
M =E M′θ x is fresh for M,M′,N, P, h,D, θ
oOut
h,D : θ | M〈N〉.P M′(x)I θ |
{
N/x
}
| P
h,D : θ | P pi I A M =E N
oMat
h,D : θ | [M = N]P pi I A
h,D : θ | P pi I A M =E N
oThen
h,D : θ | if M = N then P elseQ pi I A
h,D : θ | Q pi I A h,D, θ |= M , N
oMis
h,D : θ | [M , N]Q pi I A
h,D : θ | Q pi I A h,D, θ |= M , N
oElse
h,D : θ | if M = N then P elseQ pi I A
h · xo,D : A pi I B x is fresh for pi, h,D
oRes
h,D : νx.A pi I νx.B
h,D : θ | P pi I A bn(pi) is fresh for Q
oPar-l
h,D : θ | P | Q pi I A | Q
h,D : θ | P pi I A
oRep-act
h,D : θ | !P pi I A | !P
h,D : θ | P M(x)I θ | ν~z.
({
N/x
}
| P′
)
h,D : θ | Q M(x)I θ | Q′
x is fresh for h,D, ~z
~z are fresh for Q
oClose-l
h,D : θ | P | Q τ I θ | ν~z.
(
P′ | Q′
{
N/x
})
h,D : θ | P M(x)I ν~z.
({
N/x
}
| Q
)
h,D : θ | P M(x)I R ~z ∩ fv(P) = ∅
oRep-close
h,D : θ | !P τ I ν~z.
(
Q | R
{
N/x
}
| !P
)
Figure 4: An open late labelled transition system, plus symmetric rules for parallel composition.
Definition 3.1 (respects). Substitution σ respects h, where h is a history, whenever for all h′ and h′′
such that h = h′ · xo · h′′, we have xσ = x, and y ∈ fv(h′) implies x < yσ (i.e., x is fresh for h′σ). In
the above, fv(h′) refers to the set of all variables appearing in any term in h′.
For an example, consider the following substitutions and history.
σ =
{
u1, u2, u3/x, y, z
}
σ′ =
{
u3, u2, u1/x, y, z
}
uo1 · xi · uo2 · yi · uo3 · zi
Observe that, σ respects h. In contrast, σ′ does not respect h, since xσ′ = u3, which is forbidden
since u3, represents an output, which, according to the history, did not occur until after the input x.
When applying a respectful substitution σ to an extended processes in normal form, with ac-
tive substitution θ, we must iteratively apply the two substitutions together in order to recover an
idempotent substitution, which is a requirement for normal forms. For example, consider σ defined
above and θ defined as
{
n, {x}a, {y}b/u1, u2, u3
}
. Notice u2 and u3 in the domain of active substitution θ
represent aliases for messages that have been output, {x}a and {y}b respectively, where each of these
messages contain variables, x and y respectively, representing inputs. Thus to find the value of z we
must apply σ and θ thrice, that is zσθσθσθ = {{n}a}c. When σ and θ are such pairs of respectful
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substitutions and active substitutions we always obtain an idempotent substitution after, at most, as
many iterations as there are inputs in the history. The above observations explain why we require
the following standard machinery for defining substitutions.
Definition 3.2 (substitutions). Given substitutions σ and θ define σ ◦ θ to be the standard compo-
sition of substitutions (i.e., composition of functions). Acyclic substitutions σ are those for which
there exists a strict partial order @σ over variables such that if y ∈ fv(xσ) then x @σ y. For acyclic
substitutions σ, define σ∗ to be the substitution obtained by iteratively composing σ with itself until
it stabilises, i.e., if σ0 = id (the identity substitution) and σn+1 = σn ◦ σ, then σ∗ is σm for some m
such that σm ◦ σ = σm.
Given an active substitution θ and respectful substitution σ, we can use (σ ◦ θ)∗ to obtain a new
active substitution. This trick is used in the following definition of satisfaction, which is used to
resolve inequalities in the labelled transition system in Fig. 4. Defining satisfaction is the reason
for carrying around constraints, consisting of a history and distinction, at every step in the labelled
transition system, since, for some pairs of messages, we can only determine whether they are not
equal by observing that the constraints on their variables forbid them from being made equal.
Definition 3.3 (satisfaction). Satisfaction h,D, θ |= M , N holds whenever there does not exist
substitution σ respecting h such that:
• for all K , L ∈ D, K(σ ◦ θ)∗ ,E L(σ ◦ θ)∗
• and M(σ ◦ θ)∗ =E N(σ ◦ θ)∗.
Entailment defines a notion of intuitionistic negation, which could be extracted from a Kripke
semantics [Kri65], where the “reachable worlds” are those which can be reached by applying sub-
stitutions satisfying our constraints (or, equivalently, adding equalities). What is happening is that,
since variables subject to constraints may occur, in messages compared, it is possible that we don’t
yet have enough information to determine whether or not two messages are equal. In general, two
messages may be equal under one substitution of variables but not equal under another substitution.
Hence it is useful, in this setting, to say that neither holds yet until we have more information, i.e.,
we do not assume the law of excluded middle.
For an example of a scenario where the law of excluded middle is violated consider, entailment
uo · yi · xo, {x/u} |= x , y. This entailment does not hold yet, since
{
u/y
}
respects history uo · yi · xo, and
y
{
u/y
}
{x/u} = x, thus there exists a respectful substitution under which these messages are equal, and
other substitutions that distinguish them. Observe also x =E y also does not hold yet. Thus, clearly,
the law of excluded middle is violated.
In contrast to the above example, consider yi · uo · xo, {x/u} |= x , y. This entailment holds, since
there is no substitution σ respecting yi · uo · xo such that xσθ = yσθ, i.e., it is impossible for x and
y to be made equal under any permitted substitution. In other words, it is impossible for an attacker
who manufactures input y, using their knowledge at the time when y was input, to set y to be equal
to private name x.
Now consider the following entailments, which make use of distinctions.
uo · vo · xi · yo · zo, x , u, {y,z/u,v} |= x , y
uo · vo · xi · yo · zo, x , u, {y,z/u,v} 6|= x , z
The former entailment above holds since the most general substitution σ respecting history uo · vo ·
xi · yo · zo such that xσ{y,z/u,v} =E yσ{y,z/u,v} is σ ={u/x}, but that substitution violates the inequality
x , u. The latter entailment above does not hold since there exists substitution {v/x} respecting
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both the history and the distinction such that x{v/x}{y,z/u,v} = z. Thus under the given history and
distinction neither x , z nor x = z hold, i.e., the law of excluded middle is violated.
We find it insightful to present an explicit definition of reachability with respect to some sub-
stitution. This gives all the extended processes that are reachable from some extended process by
applying some substitution, subject to constraints given by histories and distinctions.
Definition 3.4 (reachability). For a set of variables V, let σV be the substitution restricted to the
variables in V, i.e., if x ∈ V, xσV = xσ, otherwise xσV = x.
Reachability ≤ is such that, for history h and h′, distinction D and D′ and extended processes
in normal form A and B, we have h,D, A ≤σ h′,D′, B whenever the following hold:
• A = ν~y.(P | θ);
• σ respects h and h′ = hσ;
• For some distinction E, we haveD′ = Dσ ∪ Eσ;
• for all K , L ∈ D ∪ E, we have K(σ ◦ θ)∗ ,E L(σ ◦ θ)∗;
• ~y are fresh for σ, h,D and E;
• and B = ν~y.((σ ◦ θ)∗dom(θ) | P(σ ◦ θ)∗).
Of course, the above is only well defined if σ ◦ θ is acyclic. However, acyclicity of σ ◦ θ is an
invariant property of reachability, assuming that we start θ being id and, then generate θ and h from
transitions of our labelled transitions system by recording inputs and outputs as they occur (to be
made formal in the definition of open bisimilarity below).
Open bisimilarity ∼o can now be defined as follows, as the largest relation between processes
such that there exists an open bisimulation containing the two processes, where all the free variables
are treated as initial inputs. Notice this is the strong formulation of open bisimilarity.
Definition 3.5 (open bisimilarity). A symmetric relation R indexed by a history and distinction is
an open bisimulation whenever: if A Rh,D B the following hold, for x fresh for A, B, h,D:
• whenever h,D, A ≤σ h′,D′, A′ and h,D, B ≤σ h′,D′, B′, we have A′ Rh′,D′ B′.
• A and B are statically equivalent.
• If h,D : A τ I A′ there exists B′ such that h,D : B τ I B′ and A′ Rh,D B′.
• If h,D : A M(x)I A′, for some B′, we have h,D : B M(x)I B′ and A′ Rh·xo,D B′.
• If h,D : A M(x)I A′, for some B′, we have h,D : B M(x)I B′ and A′ Rh·xi,D B′.
Open bisimilarity ∼o is a binary relation over processes defined such that P ∼o Q holds whenever
there exists open bisimulation R such that P Rxi1·...xin Q holds, where fv(P) ∪ fv(Q) ⊆ {x1, . . . xn}.
The second clause checks static equivalence, as in Def. 2.2; but, in contrast to early bisimilarity,
due to the first clause we must check static equivalence holds under all substitutions respecting the
current history and distinctions, as defined by reachability. Similarly, the clauses for transitions
must be checked under all substitutions permitted by reachability. The input and output transitions
update the history in order to remember which outputs were available at each moment when an input
occurs, thereby constraining the permitted substitutions.
Remark 3.6 (practical benefits). At first sight, it may appear that closing under all substitutions
makes open bisimilarity more difficult to check than early bisimilarity; however, the opposite is
true. For many useful equational theories, such as the one featuring basic symmetric encryption
used in our model of the BAC protocol, we can calculate a finite set of most general substitutions
(and inequalities) that are sufficient to check in order to cover all solutions. This complexity is
hidden in the definition of early bisimilarity in the use of early input transitions, where early inputs
implicitly ask for all such substitutions and induced inequalities to be checked up front ...but we
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rarely know which to check at the point such inputs occur; hence when checking early bisimilarity
we require backtracking that is avoided entirely for open bisimilarity. The feature intuitionistic logic
that is being exploited here is the fact that intuitionistic constraint systems are monotonic, allowing
us to progressively close down the set of constraints without missing anything, whereas classical
negation violates this monotonicity property.
3.2. Discovering unlinkability attacks by calculation. We demonstrate our methodology, by
showing how attacks on unlinkability can be discovered with minimal heuristics simply as a cal-
culation using open bisimilarity.
The steps illustrated in the following subsections are:
3.2.1. How to initiate two readers and an ePassport, all with the same keys in the system.
3.2.2. The use of respectful substitutions to refine an input to pass a simple guard, ignoring infin-
itely many other inputs.
3.2.3. Exploiting the game behind this bisimilarity problem, to expose a distinguishing strategy.
3.2.4. Symbolically reasoning about larger messages using the sequent calculus.
Heuristics are required only for selecting which actions to perform (points 3.2.1. and 3.2.3.
above). The other steps above are calculations that could be formulated as a decision procedure,
building on decision procedures for the spi-calculus [TD10]. Here we begin by starting up two
readers, although a more general heuristic searching for a proof would probably start by starting up
n readers in order to eventually construct an inductive definition of an open bisimulation covering
the whole state space. We provide two reader sessions, since two suffice for the discovery the
particular attack highlighted.
3.2.1. Initiate two readers with the same ePassport. Our system, System, makes the first moves
by starting two reader sessions, both of which are loaded with the key information of the same
ePassport. This can be achieved by triggering two outputs, which must be get challenge messages
from readers and then sending one input to an ePassport, as in the following three transitions.
h0 : System
c(u1)I c(u2)I d(x)I SystemI
In the above, h0 , errori · get challengei · ci · di is the initial history, which constrains the initial
free variables so that they may not be instantiated with private messages that are output later during
execution. We also have SystemI defined as follows (employing abbreviations in Fig. 5), where
θ1 =
{
get challenge, get challenge/u1, u2
}
:
νke1, km1.
(
θ1 | V1(ke1, km1) | P1(ke1, km1, x) | V1(ke1, km1) | P(ke1, km1) |
!(V(ke1, km1) | P(ke1, km1)) | !νke.νkm.!(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
)
Spec can only follow these actions, by starting two reader sessions with different ePassports.
h0 : Spec
c(u1)I c(u2)I d(x)I SpecI
where SpecI is defined as follows:
νke1, km1, ke2, km2.
(
θ1 | V1(ke1, km1) | P1(ke1, km1, x) |
V1(ke2, km2) | P(ke2, km2) | !νke.νkm. (V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
)
Note, since open bisimilarity is preserved by associativity and commutativity of parallel composi-
tion and equivariance, we have already also covered the case where, in the specification, the input
is received by the ePassport with keys ke2 and km2. Note there is a third possible response by the
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The ePassport (or prover): P(ke, km) , d(x).P1(ke, km, x)
P1(ke, km, x) ,
[
x = get challenge
]
νnt.c〈nt〉.P2(ke, km, nt) P2(ke, km, nt) , d(y).P3(ke, km, nt, y)
P3(ke, km, nt, y) , if snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km) then
if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke))) then
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(y) , ke)), kt〉〉}ke in
c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
else c〈error〉
else c〈error〉
The Reader (or verifier): V(ke, km) , c〈get challenge〉.V1(ke, km)
V1(ke, km) , d(nt).V2(ke, km, nt) V2(ke, km, nt) , νnr.νkr.letm = {〈nr, 〈nt, kr〉〉}ke in
c〈m, mac(〈m, km〉)〉
Figure 5: Abbreviations for process used throughout this symbolic analysis.
specification, where a third session with yet another set of keys is started, but the distinguishing
strategy in that branch is subsumed by the distinguishing strategy in the cases we explain here.
The updated history, tracking constraints on variables after these initial three transitions, is:
h1 = h0 · u1o · u2o · xi
3.2.2. Applying respectful substitutions. Since we are reasoning symbolically, the first input, per-
formed above, is initially a variable x. When unfolding the rules of the labelled transition in Fig. 4
we find that the following transition is enabled for substitutions σ respecting history h1 equating the
messages in the guard x = get challenge, where a most general unifier is clearly
{
get challenge/x
}
.
h1
{
get challenge/x
}
· keo1 · kmo1 : θ1 |
[
x
{
get challenge/x
}
= get challenge
]
νnt.c〈nt〉.P2(ke, km, nt)
c(3)I νnt1.
(
θ1 | {nt1/3} | P2(ke, km, nt1))
The above transition is valid since, the unifier
{
get challenge/x
}
respects history h1 · keo1 · kmo1, which is
trivially the case since there are no constraints on unifying variables such as get challenge and x.
Using the above transition we induce the following transitions for the system and specification.
h1 : SystemI
{
get challenge/x
} c(3)I SystemII h1 : SpecI{get challenge/x} c(3)I SpecII
where SystemII is defined as follows (employing abbreviations in Fig. 5),
νke1, km1, nt1.
(
θ1 |
{
nt1/3
}
| V1(ke1, km1) | P2(ke1, km1, nt1) | V1(ke1, km1) | P(ke1, km1) |
!(V(ke1, km1) | P(ke1, km1)) | !νke.νkm.!(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
)
and SpecII is defined as follows.
νke1, km1, ke2, km2, nt1.
(
θ1 |
{
nt1/3
}
| V1(ke1, km1) | P1(ke1, km1, nt1) |
V1(ke2, km2) | P(ke2, km2) | !νke.νkm. (V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
)
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The updated history at this point is h2 , h1
{
get challenge/x
}
· 3o, where the substitution records that the
most recent input x was a get challenge message. In full, we have at this point:
h2 , errori · get challengei · ci · di · uo1 · uo2 · get challengei · 3o
3.2.3. Alternating play in the distinguishing game. We now appeal to the symmetry of bisimilarity,
allowing the specification SystemII to lead with one input. That strategy allows us to trigger the
reader which does not have the same keys as the ePassport that outputs a nonce in the previous step.
That approach leads to a distinguishing game that quite accurately describes a practical strategy,
which can be implemented using NFC enabled phones running a modified ePassport reader app
as demonstrated in the conference version of this paper [FHMS19]. In this strategy, the attacker
deliberately selects the reader that should fail to authenticate an ePassport if unlinkability really
holds as modelled by the idealised specification.
The flow is as follows, where annotation (†) indicates the player (the system or specification)
that leads at each point in the game. Note the system has always been leading up to now, in order to
trigger the scenario where two sessions with the same ePassport really started.
h2 : SystemII
d(nt)I (†)SystemIII c(4)I d(2)I SystemIV
h2 : (†)SpecII d(nt)I SpecIII c(4)I d(2)I SpecIV
where SystemIV is defined as follows (employing abbreviations in Fig. 5):
νke1, km1, nt1, nr2, kr2.
(
θ1 | {nt1/3} | {〈{〈nr2, 〈nt, kr2〉〉}ke1 , mac({〈nr2, 〈nt, kr2〉〉}ke1 ,km1)〉/4} |
V1(ke1, km1) | P3(ke1, km1, nt, 2) | 0 | P(ke1, km1) |
!(V(ke1, km1) | P(ke1, km1)) | !νke.νkm.!(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
)
and SpecIV is defined as follows
νke1, km1, ke2, km2, nt1, nr2, kr2.
(
θ1 | {nt1/3} | {〈{〈nr2, 〈nt, kr2〉〉}ke2 , mac({〈nr2, 〈nt, kr2〉〉}ke2 ,km2)〉/4} |
V1(ke1, km1) | P3(ke1, km1, nt, 2) | 0 | P(ke2, km2) | !νke.νkm. (V(ke, km) | P(ke, km))
)
Observe that all the above transitions proceed lazily without instantiating the input variable nt.
In the specification, the reader with keys ke2, km2 is used up entirely, without determining yet what
challenge was received. Observe also that SystemII has only one option, up to structural rules such as
commutativity of parallel composition, for following the specification (without being immediately
distinguishable), which is to continue a session with keys ke1, km1.
The updated history at this point records the two inputs and output in the order they occurred,
as follows.
h4 , h2 · nti · 4o · 2i
Remark 3.7 (playing this strategy). A question arising at this point is whether the change of player
at this point is meaningful in terms of attacker models. In general, to answer such a question we
require domain specific knowledge. Observe that the input action, where the specification leads,
selects a specific reader which should ideally behave as if it has different keys from the ePassport
issuing the challenge nonce. In reality, the attacker does indeed have the power to choose which
reader will receive an input, and so can indeed choose the reader that, according to the specification
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of unlinkability, should not successfully authenticate with the ePassport, i.e., the reader that is not
located next to an ePassport that has just engaged in an OCR session with it. Thus the need for
a game at this point is partly due to under-specification in the model where there are insufficient
observables to determine that the reader is not in proximity to the ePassport issuing a challenge.
Note this is far from being the only distinguishing strategy; other distinguishing strategies may
require a different domain-specific explanation.
3.2.4. Calculating inputs using the sequent calculus. Now consider whether P3(ke1, km1, nt, 2),
which is a subprocess of SystemIV shown in expanded form below, can make progress.
if snd(2) = mac(fst(2) , km1) then
if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(2) , ke1))) then
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(2) , ke1)), kt〉〉}ke1 in
c〈m, mac(m, km1)〉
else c〈error〉
In what follows, we must take into account the active substitution of SystemIV, which we recall
below and denote by θ4:
θ4 ,
{
get challenge, get challenge, nt1,
〈
{〈nr2, 〈nt, kr2〉〉}ke2 , mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt, kr2〉〉}ke2 , km2
)〉
/u1, u2, 3, 4
}
By the rules in Fig. 4, the two then branches of the if-then-else statements above, which
result in a non-error output, can only be triggered for particular substitutions σ. In particular, we
are interested in whether there are substitutions σ respecting history h4 such that the two equations
below hold, and, furthermore, σ is fresh for the bound variables nt1, ke1, km1, nr2, kr2 (a constraint
enforced by the oRes rule).
snd(2)(σ ◦ θ4)∗ =E mac(fst(2) , km1)(σ ◦ θ4)∗
nt1(σ ◦ θ4)∗ =E fst(snd(dec(fst(2) , ke1)))(σ ◦ θ4)∗
It is convenient to select fresh variable 2′ to represent the local view of messages that 2 can be
mapped to by the relevant substitution (σ ◦ θ4)∗, i.e., for some substitution σ′, instantiating 2′ we
have 2(σ ◦ θ4)∗ = 2′σ′. This represents the fact that 2 represents the external view of an observer
or attacker when they inject inputs, while 2′ exposes more of the internal structure of messages that
cannot be observed by an attacker. While such additional structure may contain more private infor-
mation than the attacker is immediately aware of (e.g., because the message represent a cyphertext),
that information may be required, internally by the process, in order to enable guards such as the
guard in the above if-then-else statements. This leads us to the following equations.
snd
(
2′
)
=E mac
(
fst
(
2′
)
, km1
)
and nt1 =E fst
(
snd
(
dec
(
fst
(
2′
)
, ke1
)))
We show how to calculate a most general unifier for the above equations. Firstly, we remove
destructors fst(·), snd(·) and dec(·, ·) by instantiating variables to which they are applied with the
most general form of the constructor to which the destructor is applied. This yields the following
substitution, where y1 and y2 are fresh variables.{〈
{〈y1, 〈nt1, y2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈y1, 〈nt1, y2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)〉
/2′
}
The problem now is to calculate the most general form of y1 and y2, refining the above substitution
taking into account the history h4, active substitution θ4 and bound variables nt1, ke1, km1, nr2, kr2,
as described above. This question can be formulated as the problem of calculating the most general
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solutions to a system of deducibility constraints which are generated from the above mentioned
constraints and active substitution.
The first step in this calculation is to generate an intermediate constraint system to solve. The
following is an alternative representation of a history, where the names to the left of a turnstile
represent the knowledge of the attacker at the moment when the input message to the right of that
turnstile is performed.
` error ` get challenge ` c ` d u1, u2 ` get challenge u1, u2, 3 ` nt u1, u2, 3,4 ` 2
In this case, it is sufficient to focus on the final two intermediate constraints, although, in general, the
initial constraints are essential for ensuring no private information from outputs during execution
are used to instantiate the initial knowledge. Also, u1 and u2 provide no new information so can be
safely removed from the constraints in order to focus on the essential aspects of the problem. From
the intermediate constraints 3 ` nt and 3,4 ` 2, annotated with messages generated by applying
the active substitution θ4 to each of the variables on the left of the turnstile. We also apply the
substitution generated for 2′ above, resulting in two deducibility constraints described below.
The first deducibility constraint generated is as follows, where nt′ is a fresh variable, which is
introduced for the same reason as we introduced 2′, as explained above.
3 : nt1 ` nt : nt′ (3.1)
Thus, nt′ represents any message such that for some suitable substitutions σ and σ′ we have
nt(σ ◦ θ4)∗ = nt′σ′, where dom(θ4) are fresh for σ′. Thus, the difference is that ntσ may not
refer directly the private names representing various keys and nonces, whereas nt′σ′ can.
Such deducibility constraint of the form Γ ` x : x′, where x, x′ are variables, are said to be
in solved form. This means that x, x′ can be any messages produced using information in Γ plus
some fresh variables, and x′ is the local view of x taking into account the current active substitution,
following the principles used to explain the use of 2′ and nt′. Thus the constraint (3.1) generated
above is already in solved form, hence, by itself, does not require further analysis.
The second deducibility constraint, generated from intermediate constraint 3,4 ` 2 by annotat-
ing variables with messages given by the active substitution θ4, is as follows.
3 : nt1, 4 :
〈
{〈nr2, 〈nt′, kr2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt′, kr2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)〉
` 2 :
〈
{〈y1, 〈nt1, y2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈y1, 〈nt1, y2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)〉 (3.2)
We find all solutions to the system consisting of the above deducibility constraints (3.1) and
(3.2), by calculating the most general substitutions such that there is a proof tree using the sequent
calculus rules in Fig. 6, where the leaves of each proof are either axioms or are in solved form.
Fig. 6 extends an existing sequent calculus presentation of deducibility constraints [TGD10] with
annotations to the left of a colon representing recipes for how a message is deduced. The idea of
using such annotations is due to, thus far, unpublished work of Alwen Tiu.
For this system of constraints, the only possibility is to apply the axiom in Fig. 6. This is
achieved by unifying the following messages (recall that nt1, ke1, km1, nr2, kr2 are private names
hence cannot be unified with other messages):〈
{〈nr2, 〈nt′, kr2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt′, kr2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)〉
= mac
(
{〈y1, 〈nt1, y2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)
We now use the most general unifier for the above problem, σ′ =
{
nt1, nr2, kr2/nt′, y1, y2
}
thereby allowing
the axiom in Fig. 6 to be applied to both deducibility constraints generated above (firstly ignoring
the recipes on the left of each colon). Now, taking into account the recipe on the left of each colon,
each of the deducibility constraints is an axiom only if we have 3 = nt and 4 = 2, which leads us to
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axiom
Γ,R : M ` R : M
Γ ` R1 : K1 . . . Γ ` Rn : Kn
intro
Γ ` f (R1, . . .Rn) : f (K1, . . .Kn)
where f ∈ {〈·, ·〉 , {·}· , mac(·, ·) , dec(·, ·) , fst(·) , snd(·) , }
Γ, fst(R) : M, snd(Rr) : N ` S : K
pair-elim
Γ,R : 〈M, N〉 ` S : K
Γ ` T : K Γ, dec(R,T ) : M ` S : K
enc-elim
Γ,R : {M}K ` S : N
Figure 6: Deducibility constraints, in sequent calculus style, annotated with messages representing
recipes for producing messages to the left of each colon.
the substitution σ =
{
3,4/nt, 2
}
. Notice the domain of this substitution must be {nt, 2}, since 3 and 4 are
treated as names rather then free variables (this is enforced by the constraints on output variables in
the notion of a respectful substitution).
Thereby, from deducibility constraints (3.1) and (3.2) where σ is applied to the left of each
colon and σ′ is applied to the right of each colon, we obtain the following two proofs. Each proof
consists of a single axiom, where a proof is a proof tree where all leaves are axioms (hence the set
of premises are empty and hence vacuously in solved form).
3 : nt1 ` 3 : nt1
3 : nt1, 4 :
〈
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)〉
` 4 :
〈
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke1 , km1
)〉
Thereby we have calculated the most general respectful substitution
{
3,4/nt, 2
}
, enabling the following
transition.
h4
{
3,4/nt, 2
}
: SystemIV
{
3,4/nt, 2
} c(z)I SystemV
where the frame of SystemV (ignoring the process) is as follows.
νke1, km1, nt1, nr2, kr2, kt1.
({
get challenge, get challenge/u1, u2
}
| {nt1/3} |{〈
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke1 ,km1
)〉
/4
}
|
{〈
{〈nt1, 〈nr2, kt1〉〉}ke1 , mac
(
{〈nt1, 〈nr2, kt1〉〉}ke1 ,km1
)〉
/z
}
| . . .
)
Observe that the specification, SpecIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
can also perform an output, either starting a new
session, or triggering an error message. In either case, we reach a state that is distinguishable by
static equivalence witnessed by the test z = error or z = get challenge respectively.
Notice that in the specification, the else branch in which an error message is output is enabled
by the oElse rule in Fig. 4. That rule is enabled only when the following inequality holds, where
h′4 is the current history extended with the private names by using the oRes rule as follows, i.e.,
h′4 = h4
{
3,4/nt,2
}
·keo1 ·kmo1 ·keo2 ·kmo2 ·nto1 ·nro2 ·kro2 ·kto1 and ρ4 is the active substitution of SpecIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
at this point.
h′4, ρ4 |= mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke2 , km2
)
, mac
(
{〈nr2, 〈nt1, kr2〉〉}ke2 , km1
)
The above inequality is satisfied, since there is no substitution respecting h′4 equating the two
terms in the above inequality, i.e., it holds even under intuitionistic assumptions. To see why, ob-
serve that any unifier for the above message equates km1 and km2, which must be kept distinct by
any substitution respecting the above history, since both kmo1 and km
o
2 appear in the history.
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3.3. Constructing a distinguishing formula from the distinguishing strategy. Firstly, we briefly
summarise the distinguishing strategy calculated in the previous subsections.
(1) System leads with transitions labelled c(u1) then c(u2) and then d(x) (thereby reaching
SystemI in which sessions have started with two readers and an ePassport, all using the
same keys).
(2) SystemI
{
get challenge/x
}
leads with transition labelled c(3). If SpecI
{
get challenge/x
}
follows with
3 = get challenge, we are done, otherwise continue.
(3) SpecII leads with transition labelled d(nt) starting up the wrong reader. If SystemII follows
by inputting the wrong message into a new ePassport session this can be picked up by
performing one more action, otherwise continue.
(4) SystemIII leads with transitions labelled c(4) and then d(y). If SpecIII follows with 4 =
get challenge we are done, otherwise continue.
(5) SystemIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
leads with transitions c(z). This can only be followed by a transition from
SpecIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
reaching a state where z = error or z = get challenge.
The problem now is that open bisimilarity (Def. 3.5) does not satisfy any notion of completeness,
hence a distinguishing strategy may be a spurious counterexample. Spurious counterexamples,
cannot be transformed into counterexamples for strong early bisimilarity (Def. 2.9) and are less
likely to indicate the presence of an attack.
The above strategy does not describe a spurious counterexample; and furthermore it can be
turned into a real attack. In order to show that it is not a spurious counterexample, our methodology
is to construct a modal logic formula from the distinguishing strategy. Instead of using a modal logic
characterising open bisimilarity (which would be a generalisation of intuitionistic OM [AHT17] to
the applied pi-calculus, making used of the notion of reachability in Def. 3.4) we employ a modal
logic characterising strong early bisimilarity called classical FM.
3.3.1. Introducing classical FM. The syntax of modal logic classical FM (F is for free inputs,
M is for match [MPW93]) is presented below.
φF M = N equality
| φ ∧ φ conjunction
| 〈pi〉φ diamond
| ¬φ negation
abbreviations:
M , N , ¬(M = N)[
pi
]
φ , ¬〈pi〉¬φ
φ ∨ ψ , ¬ (¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
The semantics of classical FM is given by the least relation A |= φ between extended processes A
and formulae φ satisfying the conditions in Fig. 7.
ν~x.(θ | P) |= M = N iff Mθ =E Nθ and ~x are fresh for M and N
A |= 〈pi〉φ iff there exists B such that A pi I B and B |= φ.
A |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff A |= φ1 and A |= φ2.
A |= ¬φ iff A |= φ does not hold.
Figure 7: The semantics of modal logic “classical FM”.
The following theorem formulates what it means for classical FM to characterise strong early
bisimilarity.
Theorem 3.8. P ∼ Q, whenever, for all formula φ, we have P |= φ if and only if Q |= φ.
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The proof is provided in the appendix. From the contrapositive of the above theorem, whenever
P / Q, there exists a formula φ such that P |= φ holds, but Q 6|= φ. Such a formula is called a
distinguishing formula.
3.3.2. The attack on BAC as a formula. We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2.4, restated
below for convenience, which establishes that strong unlinkability of the BAC protocol fails.
Theorem 3.9 (Theorem 2.4 restated). System 0 Spec.
Proof. In order to establish the failure of strong unlinkability of the BAC protocol, we make use of
the following classical FM formula ψ.
ψ ,
〈
c(u1)
〉〈
c(u2)
〉〈
d get challenge
〉〈
c(3)
〉(
3 , get challenge∧[
d 3
]( 〈
c(4)
〉〈
d 4
〉〈
c(z)
〉(
4 , get challenge ∧ z , get challenge ∧ z , error)
∨ [c(4)](4 = get challenge) ))
For this formula we can verify System |= ψ holds; while Spec 6|= ψ. Hence, by Theorem 3.8,
System / Spec; thereby by Theorem 2.10, System 0 Spec, as required.
This closes the initial question of whether or not unlinkability holds for the BAC protocol;
the answer is that the BAC protocol does not satisfy unlinkability, at least as specified originally
in CSF’10 [ACRR10]. This leads to several immediate questions. Firstly, how do we construct
the above formula from the distinguishing strategy given by open bisimilarity (to be addressed in
Sec. 3.3.3)? Secondly, can we explain why the formula is distinguishing, and from that explanation
describe a practical attack? Thirdly, how do we approach this problem in general, e.g., when a
spurious counterexample is discovered? We focus on the first question in this paper. The second is
addressed in the conference version of this paper [FHMS19]; while the third question is worthy of
future work.
We emphasise at this point that there are infinitely many alternative distinguishing formulae
for this problem, not only ψ. Some such distinguishing formulae use no box modality and instead
employ conjunction, where conjunction also appeals to the branching time nature of bisimilarity.
We postpone discussing alternatives until Sec. 4, where we propose an alternative model of unlink-
ability, where the meaning of distinguishing strategies is clearer.
3.3.3. How to construct the distinguishing formula. We construct the formula named φ, used as the
distinguishing formula in the proof of Theorem 2.4 (reiterated as Theorem 3.9), by induction on the
depth of the distinguishing strategy summarised at the top of Sec. 3.3. To do so, we work backwards
through the distinguishing strategy. Note we refer to processes representing intermediate states of
an execution previously defined throughout Sec. 3.
Firstly, observe that when the system is in state SystemV the specification must be in a state
where either error = z, get challenge = z or get challenge = 4, where each pair of messages shows
static equivalence is violated. Since for SystemV both 4 and z cannot be unified with get challenge
or error with respect to the history at that point, the intuitionistic negation and classical negation
coincide for these equalities, leading to the following formula distinguishing SystemV from any
state the specification can reach at that point.
SystemV |= error , z ∧ get challenge , 4 ∧ get challenge = 4
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Since the system leads in order to reach this state using transition SystemIV
{
3,4/nt,2
} c(z)I SystemV,
we add a diamond modality to the formula, as follows.
SystemIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
|= 〈c(z)〉(error , z ∧ get challenge , 4 ∧ get challenge = 4)
The above step is standard for constructing modal logic formulae for distinguishing strategies; how-
ever the next step requires care. Firstly, note that the substitution
{
3,4/nt,2
}
concerns input variables.
Thus we push these substitutions back through the distinguishing strategy until the relevant input
is instantiated. At this point, since the input action in the distinguishing strategy reaching state
SystemIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
introduced variable y, that variable is instantiated immediately, and nt is pushed
back through the strategy, refining the distinguishing strategy to obtain the following transitions
using the rules of Fig. 3.
SystemIII
{3/nt} c(4)I d 4I SystemIV{3,4/nt,2}
Since the system was leading, SystemIII{3/nt} can be distinguished from SpecIII{3/nt} by the following
formula.
SystemIII
{3/nt} |= 〈c(4)〉〈d 4〉〈c(z)〉(error , z ∧ get challenge , 4 ∧ get challenge = 4)
The next step in the distinguishing strategy involves a change of leading player, where the spec-
ification leads with an action. By pushing back the substitution through the strategy, instanti-
ating the input variable on the label, we have the following transition led by the specification:
SpecII d 3I SpecIII{3/nt}. Since the specification leads at this point and the system follows in any
way it can, we write the box modality in the distinguishing formula for the system followed by
a disjunction of formulae, where each formula distinguishes SpecIII{3/nt} from any state reachable
from SystemII by an input transition labelled with d 3.
Observe that, as well as SystemIII{3/nt} for which we constructed a distinguishing formula above,
there is another, quite distinct, process reachable from SystemII by a d 3 transition that can be dis-
tinguished by formula
[
c(4)
]
(4 = get challenge) representing that the case when input transition la-
belled with d 3 results in feeding 3 into a new reader session, which kills the possibility of continuing
an existing session with an output transition. Note this formula is also constructed algorithmically,
as we are describing, but this branch is more due to a limitation of the original model unlinkability
communicated in CSF’10, that we address next in Sec. 4. Hence we draw no further attention to
that branch at this point.
Thereby, we obtain the following formula distinguishing SystemII from SpecII.
SystemII |= [d 3]( 〈c(4)〉〈d 4〉〈c(z)〉(4 , get challenge ∧ z , get challenge ∧ z , error)
∨ [c(4)](4 = get challenge) ))
The rest of the construction of formula ψ follows the pattern of steps already described above,
where a diamond modality is appended whenever the system leads and substitutions are pushed
back through the distinguishing strategy until they instantiate the relevant input, or reach the root of
the formula.
We present an informal graphical depiction of the game that ψ describes in Fig. 8. In the figure,
annotation (†) indicates where a process takes over as the leading process in the strategy. When a
process is not leading it may have the option to try more than one counter move, represented by the
branches in the strategy.
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(†) System
c(u1)

Spec
c(u1)

c(u2)

c(u2)

d get challenge

d get challenge

SystemI
c(3)

SpecI
c(3)

c(3)
((
SystemII
d 3

d 3
**
(†) SpecII
d 3

3 = get challenge
(†) SystemIII{3/nt}
c(4)

c(4)

SpecIII{3/nt}
c(4)

c(4)
((
d 4

4 = get challenge
d 4

4 = get challenge
SystemIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
c(z)

SpecIV
{
3,4/nt,2
}
c(z)

c(z)
((
z , error ∧ z , get challenge z = error z = get challenge
Figure 8: Distinguishing strategy implied by distinguishing formula ψ.
4. A New Chapter for Unlinkability: Refining the Model of Unlinkability
While the previous sections closed a chapter in the story of unlinkability, by proving that there
is an attack on the model of unlinkability of the BAC protocol as originally communicated in the
proceedings of CSF’10 [ACRR10], this section opens a new chapter by justifying a new model of
unlinkability. This new model of unlinkability is a modest improvement on the model previously
proposed. It incorporates some explicit observables reflecting the ability of the attacker to observe
and hence control the creation of radio frequency communication channels. We demonstrate here
why our proposed model of unlinkability more accurately models the distinguishing power of an
attacker, and how descriptions of attacks on BAC, given by modal logic formulae, become clearer.
This section can also been seen as introducing preliminaries required for Section 5, where we show
how the model proposed discovers new attacks on the PACE protocol that follow a similar pattern
to the attacks discovered on the BAC protocol.
The model of strong unlinkability originally proposed in CSF’10 [ACRR10] has many merits.
However, a limitation we would like to draw attention to is that it matters whether or not we include
the get challenge message that the reader sends to initiate the protocol. That get challenge message
happens to be essential for the attacks on unlinkability described in the previous section since, by
limiting the get challenge messages sent and received, we can count the number of sessions that are
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present and thereby infer when a message sent is a ciphertext in an existing session of the protocol
rather than a fresh nonce at the beginning of a new protocol.
This is perhaps clearest in Fig. 8 of the previous section. Observe that in order to reach the
bottommost state in the figure, we ensure that no additional sessions are started beyond the two
reader sessions and one ePassport session at the beginning triggered by the topmost three actions
in the figure. This causes problems, three of which are highlighted below, which are all due to the
modelling decision where all parties use the same channel c for output and d for inputs.
• Limitation 1. It is inconvenient and confusing for a new reader to, throughout the strategy,
add branches that have the effect of saying “at this point we don’t start a new session.”
• Limitation 2. In the reality, the attacker can directly observe whether or not two inputs or
outputs are performed within the same session of a protocol and, furthermore, can distin-
guish between a session with a reader or with an ePassport. This is not only because the
attacker must be aware of the physical location of each entity, but also because, for each
session, the attacker must open a new channel using the underlying transport protocol, as
standardised in ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO18].
• Limitation 3. Finally, the fact that get challenge message is useful for counting the number
of each type of session initiated, is rather a misuse of that message. Message get challenge
contributes nothing to this authentication protocol (other than impeding the stronger authen-
tication property synchronisation [CMdV06], which is immediately violated in protocols
with a constant message). Hence removing it from a model of BAC should not result in
attacks ceasing to exist.
The above limitations of existing models used to analyse the unlinkability of the BAC protocol,
as employed in previous sections, can be addressed simply by declaring a fresh public channel for
each session. To do so, we extend the model with two channels, say passport and reader, that are
used to model the creation of a new channel in the respective roles of either an ePassport or a reader.
In the applied pi-calculus, we achieve this by outputting a fresh channel to the environment on these
channels for each session, as in the following new scheme for the system and specification.
Scheme for System: !ν~k.!
(
νc.passport〈c〉.Prover(c,~k) | νc.reader〈c〉.Verifier(c,~k)
)
Scheme for Specification: !ν~k.
(
νc.passport〈c〉.Prover(c,~k) | νc.reader〈c〉.Verifier(c,~k)
)
The above we propose as a general scheme for RFID protocols employing symmetric keys ~k, which
are shared through another channel that the attacker cannot intercept (recall, in the case of ePassport
protocols this is usually achieved by an OCR session).
Notice we directly employ a presentation of processes that does not involve τ-transitions. This
simplifies the problem such that strong notions of bisimilarity may be employed, without loss of
modelling power. Of course, to do so, we should assume each instance of Prover and Verifier is
a sequential process (or apply another suitable restriction for forbidding τ-transitions internal to a
single reader or ePassport).
4.1. The unlinkability of the BAC protocol, simplified. Following the above scheme for the BAC
protocol, ~k is ke, km, and Prover(c, ke, km) and Verifier(c, ke, km) are instantiated with the processes
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PBAC(c, ke, km) and VBAC(c, ke, km) defined below.
PBAC(c, ke, km) , νnt.c〈nt〉.c(y).
if snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km) then
if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke))) then
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(y) , ke)), kt〉〉}ke in
c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
else c〈error〉
else c〈error〉
VBAC(c, ke, km) , c(nt).νnr.νkr.
letm = {〈nr, 〈nt, kr〉〉}ke in c〈m, mac(〈m, km〉)〉
Notice the above processes are simply P(ke, km){c/d} and V(ke, km){c/d} from the previous sections,
but with prefixes concerning the get challenge message removed.
In summary, we propose that the problem of whether there is an attack on the unlinkability of
the BAC protocol can be resolved by proving that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.1. SystemBAC / SpecBAC, where
SystemBAC , !ν~k.!
(
νc.passport〈c〉.PBAC(c,~k) | νc.reader〈c〉.VBAC(c,~k)
)
SpecBAC , !ν~k.
(
νc.passport〈c〉.PBAC(c,~k) | νc.reader〈c〉.VBAC(c,~k)
)
Proof. Consider the FM formula below.
ϕ ,
〈
reader(c1)
〉〈
reader(c2)
〉〈
passport(c3)
〉〈
c3(nt)
〉(〈
c1 nt
〉〈
c1(4)
〉〈
c3 4
〉〈
c3(z)
〉
(z , error)
∧ 〈c2 nt〉〈c2(4)〉〈c3 4〉〈c3(z)〉(z , error) )
Since SystemBAC |= ϕ, but SpecBAC 6|= ϕ, by Theorem 3.8, SystemBAC / SpecBAC.
Now compare the distinguishing strategy generated by ϕ, presented in Fig. 9, to the distinguish-
ing strategy for ψ in the previous section, presented in Fig. 8. The attacks described start in a similar
fashion. In both figures, the system starts up two readers and an ePassport with the same keys. The
specification can only follow by starting two readers with different keys; hence when the ePassport
is initialised is has different keys from at least one of the readers. We draw attention to two key
differences between the strategies presented below.
The first notable difference between the strategies is that Fig. 9 does not require many sub
branches of the game involving get challenge messages. Those branches that appear throughout
Fig. 8 are no longer required, since we can directly observe the number of sessions that are present,
rather than implicitly controlling the number of sessions by preventing new sessions from initialis-
ing. This difference is beneficial for cleaning up messy strategies, making them easier to explain,
and allowing more protocols to be analysed without having to insert constant messages into the
model of the protocol.
The second notable difference between the strategies is that in Fig. 9 the system always leads,
including at the point where branching occurs. By the time the system decides which branch to
take, the specification has already committed to a state where the the ePassport has different keys
from either the reader on channel c1 or the reader on channel c2. The strategy of the system is to
choose to communicate with the reader which has keys that are different to those of the ePassport.
Thereby the system wins the game since it can reach a state where no error is produced by the chosen
ePassport — a strategy that cannot be matched by the specification. In contrast, the strategy in Fig. 8
achieved a similar effect but in a different way: the attacker changes perspective by switching to a
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(†) SystemBAC
reader(c1)

SpecBAC
reader(c1)

reader(c2)

reader(c2)

passport(c3)

passport(c3)
vv
passport(c3)
((
c3(nt)

c3(nt)

c3(nt)

c1 nt
uu
c2 nt
))
c1 nt

c2 nt

c1(4)

c2(4)

c1(4)

c2(4)

c3 4

c3 4

c3 4

c3 4)

c1(z)

c2(z)

c1(z)

c2(z)

z , error z , error z = error z = error
Figure 9: Distinguishing strategy implied by distinguishing formula ϕ.
view where the leading player is the specification, i.e., what should hypothetically happen. Recall,
in Fig. 8, after the change of player, the strategy is for the specification to choose to communicate
with a reader that should produces an error message; but the system has no way to produce such an
error message hence the system clearly is not equivalent to the hypothetical situation modelled by
the specification.
4.2. From bisimilarity to notions of similarity. Above, we highlighted that the leader in the strat-
egy in Fig. 9 is always the same. This means that we do not require the full power of bisimilarity
to discover this attack strategy. Indeed, it is sufficient to use a similarity preorder, which is obtained
from strong early bisimilarity in Def. 2.9 by dropping the requirement that the relation is symmet-
ric. To be explicit, in the specification of unlinkability, we could employ the following notion of
similarity instead of bisimilarity.
Definition 4.2 (similarity). A relation between extended processes R is a strong early simulation
only if, whenever A R B the following hold:
• A and B are statically equivalent.
• If A pi I A′ there exists B′ such that B pi I B′ and A′ R B′.
Process P is simulated by processes Q, written P  Q, whenever there exists a strong early simula-
tion R such that P R Q.
In both the old scheme for unlinkability, as communicated in CSF’10, and in our new updated
scheme introduced in this section, it is trivial that the process modelling the specification, e.g.,
SpecBAC, is simulated by the system process SystemBAC, i.e., SpecBAC  SystemBAC holds. To see
why, intuitively, observe that if we have full control of the system we can always make it behave like
30 R. HORNE AND S. MAUW
the specification by never using the same ePassport twice thus the specification can be simulated by
the system. Hence, the problem of checking unlinkability, when cast as a similarity problem, can be
formulated by the problem of checking whether SystemBAC  SpecBAC, i.e., checking whether any
observable behaviours the system can perform can be simulated by behaviours of the specification.
Stated as a theorem, we have the following which tightens Theorem 2.4, where the proof follows
from the same strategy as presented in Fig. 9.
Theorem 4.3. SystemBAC  SpecBAC does not hold.
It is helpful to know that similarity is sufficient for this problem, since similarity preorders
have compelling attacker models, e.g., in terms of probabilistic testing semantics [DvGHM08].
Indeed, it is standard in cryptography to assume that an adversary has the power of a probabilistic
polynominal-time Turing machine, even if the protocol does not contain probabilistic choices, which
is reflected in power made available to the attacker by adopting similarity.
Remark 4.4. Note furthermore, that there are several variants of similarity in the linear-time /
branching-time spectrum [vG01], which, as touched on in Sec. 2.5, could be compelling choices for
modelling the capabilities of attackers. We argue that a more broadly applicable design decision
would be to employ a stronger notion of similarity called failure similarity. For example, failure
similarity can distinguish process !a〈go〉.a〈error〉 | !a〈go〉 from !a〈go〉.a〈error〉, whereas similarity
in Definition 4.2 cannot distinguish these processes. Thus we can test that an event does not happen,
e.g., by using a timeout [vG20], which is a distinction that cannot be made using similarity.
Such additional expressive power is not required in order to detect unlinkability attacks on the
BAC protocol, but might be useful in some scenarios where, for example, the attacker can explicitly
observe an error due to the presence of a message, but cannot explicitly observe a success. In
such scenarios, a success can be inferred by observing that an error does not occur within an
expected time window. For example, the ICAO 9303 specification of the PACE protocol [MRT15]
only requires the ePassport to send an error message at the end of an unsuccessful authentication
session, but does not require it to send any message if the session results in authentication being
successful; hence successful authentication from the perspective of an ePassport can be inferred by
the absence of an error message at the end of the session within an expected time window. However,
when we model the PACE protocol in Sec. 5 we use explicit observables for success, so as to align
with related work thereby avoid unnecessary debate about whether our attacks are particular to
how we model the PACE protocol (they are not). Thus, it is safest to verify unlinkability with respect
to bisimilarity, which covers all such attacks, including the richer strategy in Fig. 8. Recall that
we were able to assign a practical meaning to that strategy, which would not even be in scope for
failure similarity, by using domain knowledge, as explained in Sec. 3 and expanded on further in
the conference version of this paper [FHMS19].
4.3. Without else branches there is still an attack. Some papers that analyse the BAC protocol
drop the else branch [CDS20]. This is convenient since not all tools and methods handle else
branches. For example, we may instead try to use the following model of an ePassport in the system
and specification processes.
Pno elseBAC (c, ke, km) , νnt.c〈nt〉.c(y).[
snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km)
][
nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke)))
]
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(y) , ke)), kt〉〉}ke in c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
However, even for this variant, using bisimilarity, we discover an attack on unlinkability. To see why,
observe that if authentication succeeds, instead of checking the final message sent by the ePassport
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is not an error, it is sufficient to check that some message is sent at that point. If no message was
transmitted, then we can infer the tests on the nonce failed.
A classical FM formula distinguishing the system from the specification, obtained using the
process above to model the passport is as follows.
ϕ′ ,
〈
reader(c1)
〉〈
reader(c2)
〉〈
passport(c3)
〉〈
c3(nt)
〉(〈
c1 nt
〉〈
c1(4)
〉〈
c3 4
〉〈
c3(z)
〉
tt
∧ 〈c2 nt〉〈c2(4)〉〈c3 4〉〈c3(z)〉tt )
Notice the difference compared to ϕ is that ϕ′ is not required to test whether z is not an error. Indeed,
when we reach the final action of the distinguishing strategy, the specification is unable to perform
any action on channel c3, hence cannot simulate the behaviour of the system.
4.4. A refinement of BAC satisfying unlinkability. Another alternative is to probabilistically en-
crypt the error message, or produce random noise when the ePassport fails to authenticate the reader.
Note this is within the scope of the BAC protocol specification, since it does not fix the form of the
error message, although, to our best knowledge, real ePassports implementing the BAC protocol
send errors as constant plaintext messages.
Such a refinement of the BAC protocol where error messages are obscured, does in fact satisfy
unlinkability, as long as nothing happens after executing the BAC protocol. We can model one such
variant of the BAC protocol as follows.
P f ixedBAC (c, ke, km) , νnt.c〈nt〉.c(y).
if snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km) then
if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke))) then
νkt.letm = {〈nt, 〈fst(dec(fst(y) , ke)), kt〉〉}ke in
c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
else νr.letm = {〈r, error〉}ke in c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
else νr.letm = {〈r, error〉}ke in c〈m, mac(m, km)〉
Let System f ixedBAC and Spec
f ixed
BAC denote, respectively, the system and specification for unlinkability of
BAC where the above model of the ePassport role is used. For this model we have a proof that
unlinkability does hold, i.e., System f ixedBAC ∼ Spec f ixedBAC . The publication of a proof for this claim
is pushed to future work, in the interest of focussing on attacks in this paper. Presenting details
about how to systematically find proofs for such unlinkability claims, as opposed to finding attacks,
requires additional heuristics to be explained.
The problem with the above refinement of the BAC protocol satisfying unlinkability is that
making BAC unlinkable does not guarantee that the whole ePassport protocol satisfies unlinkability.
BAC is just for authentication and establishing a session key. After authenticating the ePassport
proceeds with a secure messaging phase that uses the session key to transmit personal data stored in
the ePassport [MRT15]. Thus it is sufficient for an attacker to look at whether the protocol proceeds
with secure messaging or not in order to determine whether authentication was successful. That
knowledge can be used to the same effect as observing whether or not an error message was sent.
Thus, for the above fix to be fully effective, the secure messaging phase should proceed even if the
ePassport does not authenticate, transmitting dummy data indistinguishable to an observer from the
real data. Such a fix is outside the scope of the current ICAO specification.
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5. Unlinkability of the PACE protocol
We address the public communication from the office of the secretary general of ICAO, discussed
in the introduction, which challenges whether the unlinkability vulnerability discovered on BAC is
valid for more recent versions of the ICAO 9303 ePassport standard [MRT15]. This is a reasonable
question, since the 7th edition of the ICAO 9303 standard recommends the Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment protocol (PACE), as a more secure alternative to BAC.
PACE does improve on the security of BAC, making attacks giving access to private data stored
on the chip more difficult. For example, PACE satisfies forward secrecy [BFK09]; whereas BAC
does not, that is: if an attacker intercepts ciphertexts in anticipation of, in the future, discovering
the key for the ePassport, then she cannot go back and use the key to discover the session key and
reveal the encrypted secrets from those old runs of the protocol.
The PACE protocol also eliminates unlinkability vulnerabilities caused by using different errors
when the protocol fails for different reasons, as was the case for an implementation of the BAC
protocol for French ePassports. Thus we believe that some of the most serious types of attack on
unlinkability exploiting the BAC protocol have been addressed in the PACE protocol, where such
attacks on the BAC protocol allow an ePassport holder with an implementation interpreting the
specification in a particular way to be tracked forever after the messages from one session with a
trusted reader have been intercepted.
The clause of the standard that restricts the use of error messages is the following line in section
4.4.2 of part 11 of the ICAO 9303 standard.
“An eMRTD chip that supports PACE SHALL respond to unauthenticated read at-
tempts (including selection of (protected) files in the LDS) with “Security status not
satisfied” (0x6982).”
The above explicit statement is an improvement over the specification of the BAC protocol; however
there are still unlinkability vulnerabilities in the PACE protocol as specified in the ICAO 9303
standard. Similarly to the vulnerability in the BAC protocol, studied throughout previous sections,
there are vulnerabilities in the PACE protocol valid due to differences between a successful and
failed authentication session observable to an attacker, such as the presence of the error message
highlighted above. We formally analyse this vulnerability using bisimilarity following our revised
approach to unlinkability justified in Sec. 4.
5.1. The PACE protocol. There are multiple ways to interpret the PACE protocol since it has
various operational modes that permit a number of cryptographic primitives to be used at each stage
for establishing shared keys. We model here the generic mapping which uses a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. The message exchange, presented in Fig. 10, follows closely related work communicated
in JCS’19 [HBD19], thereby avoiding unnecessary debate on how the protocol is interpreted.
The message flow in Fig. 10 is as follows.
(1) The ePassport shares information for generating a key k with the reader, usually via an
OCR session with the biometric page of the ePassport. This is modelled by the dotted line
above. PACE uses better sources of randomness than BAC, however this does not affect our
unlinkability analysis.
(2) The ePassport key uses the key k to transmit an encrypted nonce {s}k to the reader.
(3) The ePassport and reader employ one of several operational modes to create additional
randomness for each session. We model the “generic mapping” operational mode which
employs a Diffie-Hellman handshake. This information is used to generate shared key G =
gen
(
(gnr)nt, s
)
, where gen(·, ·) is key generation function. Notice G = Gˆ in Fig. 10.
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Gˆnr
′
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′
Gnr
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ˆkm = (Gˆnt
′
)nr
′
MACr = mac
(
Gˆnt
′
, ˆkm
)km = (Gnr′)nt′
MACt = mac
(
Gnr
′
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)
MACr
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MACr 6= mac
(
Gnt
′
, km
)
MACt
Figure 10: The PACE protocol, using a generic mapping based on Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement.
(4) A Diffie-Hellman handshake is performed using G as the generator, which is used to com-
pute a MAC key km. Also an encryption key for the secure messaging phase, which we do
not model, is generated at this point. Again km = ˆkm. The checks Gnr , Gnt at this point
avoid reflection attacks, where an ePassport or reader is used to authenticate itself.
(5) Finally the ePassport and reader exchange and verify MACs, using the MAC key km, au-
thenticating the public keys exchanged in the previous step. If authentication fails at this
point an error message is produced. Notice we include the above mentioned error message
(0x6982) if authentication fails at the end of the protocol.
5.2. PACE in the applied pi-calculus. For PACE we require an extended message theory. We
require symmetric encryption, where decryption is not detectable (modelled by the same equations
as employed for the BAC protocol). For the Diffie-Hellman exchanges we require exponentiation
and also a key generating map, which acts like a two parameter hash function. As for the BAC
protocol, MACs are modelled as a two parameter hash function. This message theory is presented
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below.
M,N F x variable
| mac(M,N) mac
| gen(M,N) generator
| MN exponentiation
| {M}N encryption
| dec(M,N) decryption
dec({M}K ,K) =E′ M
{dec(M,K)}K =E′ M
(MN)K =E′ (MK)
N
The ePassport and reader for the PACE protocol can be modelled in the applied pi-calculus as
follows.
PPACE(c, k) , νs.c〈{s}k〉.c(x).c〈gnt〉.
letG = gen(s, xny) in
c(y).νnr′.c
〈
Gnt
′〉[
Gnt
′
, y
]
c(z).
let km = znt
′
in
if z = mac
(
Gnt
′
, km
)
then c〈mac(z, km)〉
else c〈error〉
VPACE(c, k) , c(x).c〈gnr〉.c(y).
letG = gen(dec(x, k) , ynr) in
νnr′.c
〈
Gnr
′〉
.c(z).[
Gnr
′
, z
]
let km = znr
′
in
c〈mac(z, km)〉
c(m).
[
m = mac
(
Gnr
′
, km
)]
c(n)
Notice only the ePassport features an error message if authentication fails in the final step. Also,
we add a dummy event c(n) at the end of the reader session, for the sake of modelling that a reader
will proceed to do something after successfully authenticating. This is to align with related work in
JCS’19 [HBD19], in order to facilitate a comparison of results obtained.
Using the above processes, and our revised scheme for unlinkability in the previous section we
obtain the following result confirming there are attacks on the unlinkability of PACE.
Theorem 5.1. SystemPACE / SpecPACE, where
SystemPACE , !νk.!
(
νc.passport〈c〉.PPACE(c, k) | νc.reader〈c〉.VPACE(c, k)
)
SpecPACE , !νk.
(
νc.passport〈c〉.PPACE(c, k) | νc.reader〈c〉.VPACE(c, k)
)
Proof. Consider the following FM formula.
ξ ,
〈
reader(c1)
〉〈
reader(c2)
〉〈
passport(c3)
〉〈
c3(t)
〉(〈
c1 t
〉〈
c1(u)
〉〈
c3 u
〉〈
c3(v)
〉〈
c1 v
〉〈
c1(w)
〉〈
c3 w
〉〈
c3(x)
〉〈
c1 x
〉〈
c1(y)
〉〈
c3 y
〉〈
c3(z)
〉
(z , error)
∧〈c2 t〉〈c2(u)〉〈c3 u〉〈c3(v)〉〈c2 v〉〈c2(w)〉〈c3 w〉〈c3(x)〉〈c2 x〉〈c2(y)〉〈c3 y〉〈c3(z)〉(z , error) )
Since SystemPACE |= ξ, but SpecPACE 6|= ξ, by Theorem 3.8, SystemPACE / SpecPACE.
The formula ξ proving that unlinkability does not hold for the PACE protocol follows a similar
pattern to the formula ϕ, used in the previous section to certify that BAC fails unlinkability. In
this strategy, the system starts two readers and an ePassport with the same keys. The specification
can only follow using a strategy where one of the readers will fail authentication. To win this
game, the system simply chooses to authenticate with the reader that is expected to fail in the
specification. That reader will obviously successfully authenticate in the system, thereby concluding
our distinguishing strategy.
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5.3. Another attack strategy from related work. Infinitely many distinguishing strategies exist
violating the unlinkability of the PACE protocol. Indeed related work [HBD19] discovered a vi-
olation of the unlinkability of the PACE protocol, that can be described as a trace. An attack on
unlinkability formulated using trace equivalence is always also an attack on bisimilarity. The added
value that our methodology brings to that attack, is that we can certify their attack by using the
following classical FM formula, describing the distinguishing trace discovered in the above men-
tioned related work. The FM formulae characterising trace equivalence are those consisting of
diamond modalities only ending with some formula that does not involve modalities.
ϑ ,
〈
reader(c1)
〉〈
reader(c2)
〉〈
passport(c3)
〉〈
c3(t)
〉〈
c1 t
〉〈
c2 t
〉〈
c1(u1)
〉〈
c2(u2)
〉〈
c2 u1
〉〈
c1 u2
〉〈
c1(v1)
〉〈
c2(v2)
〉〈
c2 v1
〉〈
c1 v2
〉〈
c1(w1)
〉〈
c2(w2)
〉〈
c2 w1
〉〈
c1 w2
〉〈
c1(x1)
〉〈
c2(x2)
〉〈
c2 x1
〉〈
c1 x2
〉〈
c1(y1)
〉〈
c2(y2)
〉〈
c2 y1
〉〈
c1 y2
〉〈
c1(z1)
〉〈
c2(z2)
〉〈
c2 z1
〉〈
c2 m
〉
tt
In the strategy described by the formula above, the encrypted nonce sent by the ePassport at the
beginning of the protocol is replayed to two different readers. The two readers are then used to
authenticate each other, exploiting the fact that the protocol is symmetric in the role of the reader
and ePassport. Authentication will only be successful if both readers have the same keys, otherwise
either reader will fail the check on the MAC at the final step of the PACE protocol. Thus, assuming
that a reader does something after authentication, we learn whether both readers talked with the
same ePassport.
The attack ϑ is quite different from attack ξ. Notice ϑ requires two readers to be fully active
during the attack, not simply present in principal, as a choice in a game, suggesting that it may
be more difficult to exploit, despite being described as a trace. Also, notice the attack can be
mitigated in several ways, e.g., by initially responding to the ePassport in the same way regardless
of whether it authenticates or not, hence, since an ePassport cannot also be authenticated at the same
time, there is no way to continue with the secure messaging phase. An alternative fix preventing
this attack is proposed in related work [HBD19], modifying the protocol such that additional role
specific information is added to the handshake. However, these fixes will not mitigate the more
serious problem described in ξ, so do not really improve unlinkability.
6. Related work
A closely related paper, that is not already covered by remarks in the body of the paper was commu-
nicated in S&P’18 [CKR18]. That paper announces the discovery of attacks on the BAC protocol
using the bounded trace equivalence checker DeepSec, but without further discussion. An inter-
esting difference between that paper and the current work is that, while we build on the original
formulation of unlinkability, as communicated in CSF’10 [ACRR10]; the S&P’18 paper proposes
another model where, instead of using a specification process, unlinkability is modelled in terms
of two systems where the number of identical users in the system differ. In such an alternative
model, in the two session case (the unbounded case in their approach is not immediately obvious),
one process model two sessions featuring the same ePassport twice, which is compared to another
process featuring two sessions each featuring a different ePassport. That is, unlinkability is formu-
lated such that the following two processes are compared, where they use cr and cp as channels for
communications with all ePassports or all readers respectively.
Diff , νke.νkm.
(
VBAC(cr, ke, km) | PBAC(cp, ke, km)
)
| νke.νkm.
(
VBAC(cr, ke, km) | PBAC(cp, ke, km)
)
Same , νke.νkm.
(
VBAC(cr, ke, km) | PBAC(cp, ke, km) | VBAC(cr, ke, km) | PBAC(cp, ke, km)
)
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Attack traces discovered using the above method, communicated in S&P’18, can be used to confirm
that two sessions are certainly not with the same ePassport. In particular, consider the following
formula describing a trace that holds for the first process but does not hold for the second process.
Diff |= 〈cp(n1)〉〈cp(n2)〉〈cr n2〉〈cr n2〉〈
cr(m1)
〉〈
cr(m2)
〉〈
cp m1
〉〈
cp m2
〉〈
cp(e1)
〉〈
cp(e2)
〉
(e1 = error ∧ e2 = error)
In the first line of the above trace, the first two messages correspond to sending two nonces, and only
the second nonce is fed as an input to both readers. On the second line of the formula, the protocol
continues for both sessions and the protocol ends with both ePassports sending error messages. If
both readers are using the same nonce, then both ePassports can only send error messages at the last
step if both ePassports are different; if both were the same ePassport then one of the two session
would successfully authenticate, hence there could not have been two error messages. I.e., it is
impossible for Same to satisfy the above formula.
The limitation we see is the above mentioned approach communicated in S&P’18 discovers
attack traces that cannot be used to positively confirm two session are with the same ePassport.
What we mean is that there is no trace that holds for the process Same that does not hold for the
process Diff; but for a trace-like attack on unlinkability we should surely be able to provide a trace
that links two sessions. Thus we should be careful interpreting the above result — it does not mean
that the above method discovers an attack on unlinkability that is in the form of a trace. Further
discussion on this appears in the conference version of this paper [FHMS19], where it is clarified
that the above limitation is due to modelling decisions and is not a feature of the DeepSec tool that
the S&P’18 paper showcases. The DeepSec tool can also be used to verify finite formulations of
the unlinkability problem using our preferred “system v.s. specification” approach — in which case
DeepSec discovers no attacks that are in the form of a trace for the BAC protocol.
An approach similar to the approach communicated in S&P’18, where two systems are com-
pared in which users in a system are permuted, has been thoroughly investigated and demonstrated
to be the preferable approach for formulating voter privacy, which is a property of eVoting sys-
tems [DKR09]. We should clarify that we are not arguing against using a “permutations of a sys-
tem” approach to voter privacy. What we are arguing is that the “system vs. specification” approach
adopted in the current paper and in the CSF’10 paper is appropriate for unlinkability, since if an
attack trace is discovered the attack trace will be able to positively confirm that two sessions are
with the same ePassport, i.e., the sessions will be linked.
6.1. Further risks to unlinkability. There are many potential privacy risk for the PACE protocol
that are not directly captured by the symbolic models in this work. We touch on the fact that the
PACE protocol offers several different operational modes. In order for a reader to determine the
appropriate operational model, before starting the protocol, the ePassport declares the operational
modes of the PACE protocol that it implements. In an environment, such as an airport, where many
different ePassports, possibly implementing different operational modes, coexist, a user may be
tracked with a probability better than a random guess.
The actual probability of guessing correctly that the same ePassport is involved in two sessions
depends on the number of different implementations of ePassport and the expected movements of
their holders. We expect the advantage gained by such a strategy to be non-negligible and it is
standard in security and privacy models that gaining a non-negligible advantage counts as an attack.
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7. Conclusion
This paper confirms there are attacks on the authentication protocols proposed in the latest ICAO
9303 specification for ePassports. Both the BAC and PACE protocols feature attacks that can be de-
scribed as a distinguishing strategy in a game played according to a specification of what it means
to satisfy unlinkability. Attacks on the BAC protocol, communicated in Theorem 2.4 and Theo-
rem 4.1, are interesting since the former resolves flawed claims that no such attack exists according
to a formulation of unlinkability dating back to CSF’10; while the latter irons out limitations of
that original model concerning the capabilities of an attacker to distinguish messages from different
readers and ePassports.
An interesting aspect of the new attack we discover on the PACE protocol, as formulated in
Theorem 5.1, is that it is not mitigated by defensive strategies that may be introduced to mitigate
attacks previously discovered using trace equivalence as communicated in the Journal of Computer
Security [HBD19] (e.g., sequentialising reader sessions will not mitigate the newly discovered at-
tack, nor will adding role information distinguishing messages of the same form originating from a
reader and from an ePassport). Furthermore, the attacks discovered previously using trace equiva-
lence require two honest readers to actively participate in the attack, whereas the new attack discov-
ered using bisimilarity requires only one honest reader to actively participate in the attack, meaning
that the attack can be realised in a broader range of scenarios. This observation challenges claims
communicated in the Journal of Computer Security, where it is argued that bisimilarity is too strong
and hence trace equivalence should be employed. Their argument is provided to support their argu-
ment that relies on trace equivalence in order to prove that unlinkability of the BAC protocol holds.
Since their results lead to contradictory advice compared to ours, difference are worth clarifying.
The crux of their argument is based on remarks communicated in CSF’10 [ACRR10] claiming
that bisimilarity may distinguish processes due to their internal state — an argument we contest
since bisimilarity is all about the games played between the adversary and its environment using
observations only; and, never, can distinctions be made based on differences in internal state (that
is the point of such observational equivalences). Presenting multiple viewpoints is healthy for aca-
demic debate; however, the fact that the attacks we discover using bisimilarity are not spurious
and furthermore are easier to realise is evidence that trace equivalence is insufficient for verifying
interactive systems such as security protocols. To further support our argument that the use of bisim-
ilarity (or, as a compromise, a suitable notion of similarity, as discussed in Sec. 4.2) is important
for such security and privacy problems, we remark that it should not be a surprise to cryptographers
that the adversary can play a strategy in a game to gain a non-negligible advantage, since related
assumptions about the adversary are standard in the long-established school of computational secu-
rity used to formally reason about cryptographic primitives. We quote R.L. Rivest on the topic of
games in cryptography [MvOV96]:
“Cryptography is also fascinating because of its game-like adversarial nature. A
good cryptographer rapidly changes sides back and forth in his or her thinking,
from attacker to defender and back. Just as in a game of chess, sequences of moves
and countermoves must be considered until the current situation is understood.”
We argue that the above remark should also hold for the symbolic verification of cryptographic
protocols, which encompasses the methodology employed in this work. In the setting of this work,
the game is defined by a bisimilarity problem specifying what it means for a protocol to satisfy
unlinkability, while attacks are strategies improving the chances of an attacker winning the game.
Such strategies can be conveniently described using modal logic formulae.
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The insight obtained, concerning the existence of unlinkability attacks on the latest ePassport
standards, is impactful for society, since ePassports are used by the citizens of over 150 countries at
the time of writing. A quick fix is to ensure that the manufactures and operators of readers are aware
of mitigation strategies, discussed in the conference version of this paper [FHMS19]. A longer term
fix would be to redesign the protocols in the ICAO 9303 specification such that ePassport holders
need not rely on the manufacturers and operators of readers to address such vulnerabilities. Further
mitigation strategies are possible, for which some preliminary ideas are discussed in Sec. 4.4.
Further to uncovering the above mentioned attacks, this paper makes multiple technical contri-
butions. We proposed and justified a new scheme for unlinkability problems in Sec. 4. We proposed
a definition of open bisimilarity for the applied pi-calculus (Def. 3.5). Our formulations of weak and
strong early bisimilarity and similarity (Defs. 2.3, 2.9, and 4.2) for the applied pi-calculus are also
new for the applied pi-calculus, incorporating minor improvements facilitating verification, such as
the adoption of a set of rules that make labelled transitions image finite. These improvements are
conventional from the perspective of established work on the pi-calculus; thus, in that direction, we
simply modernise the applied pi-calculus with respect to advances in the pi-calculus literature. The
formulation of the modal logic “classical FM” is also new, as is the rather short and neat proof
(in Appendix B) of the fact that classical FM characterises strong early bisimilarity for the applied
pi-calculus (Theorem 3.8). The methodology of using a classical FM formula to certify attacks is
new, as is the use of open bisimilarity to discover distinguishing strategies that are transformed into
attacks whenever the distinguishing strategy is not spurious. A reformulation of unlinkability re-
moving τ-transitions has appeared in related work [HBD19], but the proof that the new specification
preserves the original specification in terms of bisimilarity (Theorem 2.10) is new, as is the observa-
tion that this transformation reduces the unlinkability problem to a problem were image finiteness
holds and strong notions of bisimilarity may be applied. In short, in order to solve this problem, we
have set up a rich tool chain of methods that can be applied beyond the problem of analysing the
unlinkability of the ICAO 9303 standard.
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Appendix A. Reducing weak to strong bisimilarity
We provide here a proof for Lemma 2.6, which is used to prove that unlinkability when expressed
in terms of a strong bisimilarity problem, is equivalent to a formulation of unlinkability in terms of
weak bisimilarity (Theorem 2.10). In the proof of the lemma below we employ equivariance, which
simply allows names to be swapped.
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Definition A.1. Equivariance is the least congruence extending α-conversion such that νx.νy.P ≡
νy.νx.P, thereby allowing the order of name binders to be ignored.
Working up to equivariance has been shown to significantly reduce the search space when
constructing a bisimulation [TNH16].
Lemma A.2 (Lemma 2.6). For any P and Q such that ck is fresh for P and Q, we have
νck.
(
!ck(~k).P | !ν~k.ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
≈ !ν~k.(P | Q)
Proof. Define R to be the least symmetric relation, upto equivariance, such that for any Ri and S i
such that ck is fresh for Ri and S i and ~r is fresh for P and Q, we have that the following extended
process
A , νck, ~k1, ~k2, . . . ~kn,~r.
(
σ | R1 | . . .Rn |!ck(~k).P | S 1 | . . . S n | !ν~k.ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
is related by R to the following extended process
B , ν~k f (1),~k f (2), . . .~k f (m),~r.
(
σ | R f (1) | S f (1) | . . . | R f (m) | S f (m) |!ν~k. (P | Q)
)
where f : {1..m} → {1..n} is injective and Ri = P
{
~ki/~k
}
and S i = Q
{
~ki/~k
}
for i ∈ {1..n} \ f ({1..m}).
There are two cases to pay attention to concerning extra τ-transitions in B. Firstly, consider
A τ I νck, ~k1, ~k2, . . . ~kn, ~kn+1,~r.
(
σ | R1 | . . .Rn | P
{
~kn+1/~k
}
|!ck(~k).P | S 1 | . . . S n | !ν~k.ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
This can be matched by B by performing zero transitions, whilst staying in the relation R.
The second important case to consider is when for some j ∈ {1..n}\ f ({1..m}) we have P
{
~k j/~k
}
or
Q
{
~k j/~k
}
acts (or indeed they interact), possibly extruding some active substitution σ and fresh names
~s, as follows.
νck, ~k1, ~k2, . . . ~kn,~r.
(
σ | R1 | . . . P
{
~k j/~k
}
. . . | Rn |!ck(~k).P | S 1 | . . .Q
{
~k j/~k
}
. . . | S n | !ν~k.ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
pi I νck, ~k1, ~k2, . . . ~kn,~r, ~s.
(
σ | θ | R′1 | . . .R′j . . . | R′n |!ck(~k).P | S ′1 | . . .Q′j . . . | S ′n | !ν~k.ck
〈
~k
〉
.Q
)
In this case, B stays within relation R by using transition
B pi I ν~k f (1),~k f (2), . . .~k f (m),~k f (m+1),~r, ~s.
(
σ | θ |
R′g(1) | S ′g(1) | . . . | R′g(m) | S ′g(m) | R′g(m+1) | S ′g(m+1) |!ν~k. (P | Q)
)
where g : {1..m + 1} → {1..n} such that g(i) =
{
j if i = m + 1
f (i) otherwise , which is clearly injective.
Note we should also consider when two distinct j, j′ ∈ {1..n} \ f ({1..m}) interact in A, which has a
similar pattern, except we require pairs of processes to be added to B using the rule Rep-close.
Appendix B. Classical FM characterises strong early bisimilarity
In this paper, we prove that unlinkability properties are violated by exhibiting a distinguishing for-
mula in classical FM. A distinguishing formula is sufficient evidence to show that two processes
specifying the unlinkability property are not bisimilar, as long as the modal logic characterises
bisimilarity. Therefore the proof of soundness and completeness of strong early bisimilarity with
respect to classical FM is critical for this work. Indeed, other parts of our reasoning may be incom-
plete, e.g., using open bisimilarity to seek a distinguishing strategy, but if our method discovers an
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attack that can be described using an FM formula that we confirm is distinguishing, then we are
certain that unlinkability does not hold as formulated.
We reiterate Theorem 3.8. The proof is standard for a classical Milner-Parrow-Walker logic,
for which reason it appears in this appendix. In fact, the use of static equivalence simplifies the
analysis compared to the pi-calculus, since there are no special cases for bound actions.
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 3.8). P ∼ Q, whenever, for all φ, we have P |= φ if and only if Q |= φ.
Proof. Let R = {(A, B) : ∀φ, A |= φ iff B |= φ}. We aim to prove R is a strong early bisimulation.
Symmetry is immediate. In the following cases assume A R B.
Case of static equivalence. By definition of R for any M and N, we can apply α-conversion to
A and B such that A = ν~x.(θ | P) and B = ν~y.(σ | Q) and (~x ∪ ~y)∩ (fv(M) ∪ fv(N)) = ∅. If Mθ = Nθ,
then by definition of satisfaction, A |= M = N hence, by definition of R, B |= M = N, hence by
definition of satisfaction, Mσ = Nσ. Therefore A and B are statically equivalent.
Case of actions. Suppose A pi I A′. Hence A |= 〈pi〉tt, so by definition of R, we have B |= 〈pi〉tt
and hence for some B′ we have B pi I B′. By image-finiteness, there are finitely many Bi such that
B pi I Bi. Suppose for contradiction that A′ R Bi does not hold for all i. Then for all i, there exists
φi such that A′ |= φi and Bi 6|= φi. Hence A |= 〈pi〉(∧i φi) but B 6|= 〈pi〉(∧i φi), contradicting the
assumption that A R B. Hence for some i, A′ R Bi, as required.
Thus, R is a strong early bisimilarity, if, for all formula φ, we have P |= φ if and only if Q |= φ,
then we have P ∼ Q.
The converse direction follows by induction on the structure of φ. Assume P ∼ Q, hence there
is some strong early bisimulation R such that P R Q. In the following, assume that A R B holds.
Case of equality. Consider when A |= M = N. By α-conversion, A = ν~x.(θ | P) such that
~x ∩ (fv(M) ∪ fv(N)) = ∅. hence Mθ = Nθ. Now, by α-conversion we have B = ν~y.(σ | Q) such that
~y ∩ (fv(M) ∪ fv(N)) = ∅. So, by static equivalence, Mσ = Nσ; and hence A |= M = N, as required.
Case of conjunction. Consider when A |= φ ∧ ψ hence A |= φ and A |= ψ. So, by the induction
hypothesis B |= φ and B |= ψ and hence B |= φ ∧ ψ.
Case of negation. Consider when A |= ¬φ, hence A 6|= φ. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
B 6|= φ hence B |= ¬φ.
Case of action. Consider when A |= 〈pi〉φ. Hence A pi I A′ such that A′ |= φ. Since R is a
strong early bisimulation, there exists B′ such that B pi I B′ and A′ R B′. Hence, by the induction
hypothesis, B′ |= φ. Hence B |= 〈pi〉φ.
Hence, by induction on the structure of φ, for all formulae φ, and for all A, B such that A R B,
we have A |= φ iff B |= φ; and hence P |= φ iff Q |= φ, since P R Q.
